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2022-10-02

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2022-10-02

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Rethinking the US "Great Stagflation"! Also on the Implications for Current Asset Prices

2022-10-02

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2022-09-27

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Also on the Implications for Current Asset Prices","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1100486117","media":"钟正生经济分析","summary":"一、高通胀的复杂性。1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击","content":"<p><html><head></head><body><b>I. The complexity of high inflation.</b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s were extremely complex: First, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, harsh price controls and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively extinguish inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks, represented by the two oil crises, triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the long-term excessive inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations, triggered a wage-price spiral, and deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</p><p><b>II. The Federal Reserve's \"merits\" and \"demerits\".</b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve's tightening was not decisive enough for several reasons: First, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation was a \"non-monetary phenomenon\"; Secondly, the Federal Reserve's primary goal at the time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\"; Finally, the Fed's decisions are also influenced by political factors. After 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, absorbed the ideas of the \"monetary school,\" took it upon itself to curb inflation, firmly uphold rate hike, and control the money supply. Subsequently, the Federal Reserve spent a considerable period of time working to stabilize inflation expectations, reshaping its credibility.</p><p><b>III. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\".</b>The United States experienced four rounds of economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, which can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82). These were the result of the combined effects of high inflation, high interest rates, and supply shocks. However, the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are quite stringent: First, the CPI inflation rate may need to fall in a timely manner in the early stages of the recession; Secondly, the Federal Reserve's rate hike should not be too aggressive, and it may even need to cut interest rates in a timely manner when a recession arrives; Finally, if new supply shocks occur, a \"hard landing\" may be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><b>IV. Clues to asset prices.</b>In the 1970s and 1980s, inflation became a bellwether for the capital market. The US CPI inflation rate has peaked three times, and the US stock market has bottomed out in all of them. However, during this process, the market understands and digests the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. Over time, the US Treasury market trades less in \"recession\" and more in \"tightening\". In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. Even after the Great Stagflation ended, safe-haven assets such as the US dollar continued to perform positively for a considerable period of time.</p><p><b>V. New insights for the present.</b>First, the causes of this round of US inflation have many similarities to those of the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited; Second, although the Federal Reserve has also made \"mistakes\" in this round, it has taken a more proactive approach in combating inflation; Third, the current US economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\"; Fourth, the current round of asset price trends may bear a strong resemblance to those of the 1970s and 1980s:<b>1）</b>US stocks: Inflation remains the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.<b>2）</b>US Treasury bonds: Monetary policy remains the core influencing factor, and a decline may not occur immediately when a recession materializes; it will have to wait until monetary policy is clearly eased.<b>3）</b>US Dollar: The \"strong dollar\" may last for a long time, and a decline in the dollar may require a US Treasury yields pullback.</p><p><i>Risk warning: The US economy is weaker than expected, new supply shocks are emerging, and non-US financial risks are rising.</i></p><p>Since 2022, the US CPI inflation rate has once broken through 9%, real GDP has contracted quarter-on-quarter for two consecutive quarters, the stagflationary characteristics of the economy have become more pronounced, and the capital market has also experienced significant fluctuations. Since the Jackson Hole meeting in late August, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly mentioned \"historical experience\" on various occasions, indicating that the current U.S. economic environment is very similar to that of the 1970s and 1980s. The Federal Reserve will also fully learn from that experience, doing what it can and cannot do, in order to help the United States overcome \"stagflation\".</p><p>What are the current inflationary pressures in the United States? How will monetary policy respond? Can the US economy still achieve a \"soft landing\"? When will the capital market usher in a \"spring\"? In this report, we revisit the performance of inflation, monetary policy, economic growth, and asset prices during the Great Stagflation period in the United States from the 1970s to the 1980s, with questions about the present, and attempt to understand the logic and patterns within them, in order to provide inspiration for judging the direction of the US economy, monetary policy, and market in the near future.</p><p><b>01. The complexity of high inflation</b></p><p><b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s were extremely complex: First, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, harsh price controls and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively extinguish inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks, represented by the two oil crises, triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the long-term excessive inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations, triggered a wage-price spiral, and deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</b></p><p><b>From 1969 to 1982, the United States fell into a high inflation crisis, with the CPI inflation rate generally above 5%, reaching as high as 14.8%.</b>The year-on-year growth rate of the US CPI has been rising rapidly at a rate of over 3% since 1968. In March 1969, the CPI broke through 5% year-on-year, thus beginning a 13-year era of \"high inflation\". Between 1969 and 1982, the year-on-year growth rate of the US CPI experienced three peaks, with the peaks occurring in January 1970 (6.2%), December 1974 (12.3%), and March 1980 (14.8%). In February 1982, the CPI fell below 5% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0135dfd0a18c15e058312be783380d12\" tg-width=\"1066\" tg-height=\"490\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1965-70, blind fiscal and monetary expansion led to rising inflation.</b>With the end of post-World War II economic reconstruction and the rise of European and Asian economies, the growth momentum of the US economy has weakened, but blind policy stimulus has led to a significant overheating of the economy. From 1965 to 1970, the real GDP growth rate of the United States consistently exceeded the potential growth rate, and the output gap (the difference between real GDP and potential GDP) accounted for as much as 3-6% of potential GDP. In other words, 3-6 percentage points of the US economic growth rate at the time was driven by policy stimulus. During this period, the natural unemployment rate in the United States was 5.6-5.9%, but the actual unemployment rate remained generally below 4%. At the time, fiscal stimulus played a stronger role than money. U.S. federal spending as a percentage of GDP rose by 3.2 percentage points between 1966 and 1968, and the deficit ratio widened from 0.2% in 1965 to 2.8% in 1968. In 1968, the U.S. government began to worry about fiscal balance, and then-President Johnson signed the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 in June, supplementing fiscal revenue through tax increases. In August of the same year, the Federal Reserve \"technically cut interest rates\" to offset the impact of tax increases, adding fuel to the overheating of the economy.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fb7621fa84eb213f441091515980951c\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"426\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1971-74, harsh price controls turned \"short-term pain\" into \"long-term pain\".</b>In August 1971, the Nixon administration imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze. However, the scope of price controls continued to expand until the U.S. government completely abolished its intervention in prices in 1974. During this period, except in special circumstances, all price increases for goods and services require government approval. In mid-1972, the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 3%. This price control is considered a special case in U.S. economic history of comprehensive government intervention in prices during peacetime, and it is also considered a failed attempt. This is because, while price controls curbed price increases, they also severely dampened the enthusiasm of manufacturing enterprises, resulting in insufficient supply of goods and laying the groundwork for the subsequent deterioration of inflation. In 1974, Nixon stepped down due to the Watergate scandal, and the new President Carter took office, gradually weakening price controls. Ironically, both the Nixon and Carter administrations attempted to control prices through verbal \"admonitions.\" For example, when Carter first took office, he encouraged people to buy \"cheap goods\": \"Dare to show off to others that you specifically choose cheap goods and be proud of it.\" These admonitions were almost futile in controlling prices. The US CPI inflation rate broke through 5% again in April 1973 and then rose all the way to a stage high of 12.3% in December 1974.</p><p><b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979 demonstrated the destructive power of supply shocks on American prices.</b>In 1973, the former Soviet Union suffered a grain harvest failure due to severe weather, and subsequently entered the international market to purchase large quantities of grain, triggering the most serious food crisis since World War II. At the end of 1973, the year-on-year growth rate of the US food CPI once exceeded 20%. From October 1973 to March 1974, the first oil crisis broke out: members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, led by Saudi Arabia, announced an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, with the United States bearing the brunt. The average price of World Bank crude oil jumped from $2.70 per barrel in September 1973 to $13 per barrel in early 1974, an increase of nearly 500%. From March to September 1974, the year-on-year growth rate of the U.S. energy CPI exceeded 30%. From early 1979 to early 1980, the second oil crisis broke out: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, followed by the \"Iran-Iraq War,\" which led to a sharp decline in global oil production. The World Bank's international oil price rose from less than $15 per barrel in December 1978 to over $40 per barrel in November 1979. In March 1980, the US energy CPI peaked at 47.1% year-on-year, and the US CPI subsequently reached a peak of 14.8% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/368b46087ff151100ed782e7aa94b78d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1980, after the headline inflation rate in the United States continued to overshoot, inflation expectations spiraled out of control, and with the help of labor unions, a \"wage-price spiral\" gradually formed.</b>After years of CPI inflation exceeding 2% or even 5%, American residents have lost confidence in prices, and inflation expectations have risen. At that time, neither the Federal Reserve nor the market had a relatively limited understanding and tracking of inflation expectations. The widely cited University of Michigan survey and the Cleveland Federal Reserve model were not forecasted until around 1980. The earliest tool for monitoring inflation expectations in The United States was The Livingston Survey, which was created in 1946 and summarized inflation forecasts from businesses, governments, banks, and academia. The survey shows that inflation expectations in the United States have gradually risen since 1970, especially after the two oil crises, when inflation expectations also rose sharply along with the headline inflation rate. The negative impact of inflation expectations on prices is mainly transmitted through wages: workers demand higher wages, which in turn increases residents' spending power and businesses' cost pressures, which in turn contributes to rising prices, forming a \"wage-price spiral\".<b>In particular, in the 1970s, American unions were very powerful, and wage demands were transmitted relatively smoothly:</b>According to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at that time, union members accounted for nearly 30% of the total number of employees in the United States, and there were 200-400 strikes involving more than a thousand people each year (this number has been consistently below 30 since 2000). From mid-1976 to mid-1978, the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell to around 5-7%, but the average hourly wage growth rate of U.S. non-farm and non-managerial employees reached 6-8% year-on-year, consistently exceeding the CPI inflation rate. The stickiness of wage increases hindered a further decline in inflation and paved the way for a subsequent rebound in inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa062f9510e45fda47f5e682ec9ba17b\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve's policy response was relatively passive, consistently \"lagging behind the curve\" and failing to effectively curb inflation.</b>Before 1980, the US policy interest rate and inflation trends were highly synchronized, reflecting that the Federal Reserve had been \"lagging behind the curve\" and \"catching up with the curve\" for a considerable period of time. In May 1969, three months after the inflation rate broke through 5%, the U.S. policy interest rate began to rise significantly and exceeded the inflation rate by more than 3 percentage points. After that, the inflation rate continued to rise for about six months before it began to fall. In the second half of 1973, with the U.S. inflation rate still rising, the Federal Reserve was forced to cut interest rates under economic pressure, which accelerated the rise in inflation. In 1978, the U.S. policy rate was basically in line with the inflation rate and continued to rise step by step until December 1978, when the monthly federal funds rate broke through 10% and was 1 percentage point higher than the inflation rate. However, the policy rate soon began to lag behind the inflation rate again. Later, when the US policy interest rate was significantly higher than the spot inflation rate, inflation fell significantly, and the Federal Reserve gained the initiative in curbing inflation: after 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, raised interest rates sharply to combat inflation. In mid-1981, the US policy interest rate peaked at over 19%, and in October of the same year, the CPI declined both month-on-month and year-on-year. Since then, Federal Funds rate has remained 4-9 percentage points higher than the CPI inflation rate, and the inflation rate has continued to decline.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/707eeb51701422548c5e1b935b53479d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>02. The Federal Reserve's \"Mistakes\" and \"Merits\"</b></p><p><b>In 1970-1979, the Federal Reserve's tightening was not decisive enough, due to both insufficient understanding of the relationship between inflation and monetary policy and a lack of independence in monetary policy. After 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, absorbed the ideas of the \"monetary school,\" took it upon itself to curb inflation, firmly uphold rate hike, and control the money supply. Subsequently, the Federal Reserve spent a considerable period of time working to stabilize inflation expectations, reshaping its credibility.</b></p><p><b>2.1 Reasons for the Federal Reserve's hesitation</b></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve continued to \"lag behind the curve\" for a variety of reasons.</b></p><p><b>First, the Federal Reserve once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon\".</b>At the time, the Federal Reserve disagreed on the causes of high inflation and tended to believe that inflation was mainly caused by non-monetary factors, leading to a passive response in monetary policy. For example, in 1970, the Federal Reserve, led by Burns, believed that union power had triggered cost-driven inflation and then advocated using \"income policy\" regulation rather than tightening the money supply. This also prompted the wage and price freezes later implemented by the Nixon administration. In 1974, Burns again argued that \"inappropriate fiscal discipline\" was the main cause of inflation.</p><p><b>Secondly, the Federal Reserve's primary goal at the time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\".</b>Before the 1970s, Keynesian ideas dominated the logic of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve focused on aggregate demand management and firmly believed in the existence of the Phillips curve (the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation). Therefore, the Federal Reserve sets the primary goal of monetary policy at achieving \"full employment,\" hoping to maintain a low and stable unemployment rate. Then, when the unemployment rate rises, the balance of monetary policy tilts more towards the labor market. When \"stagnation\" and \"inflation\" occurred simultaneously, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation would not continue to deteriorate. For example, the Federal Reserve led by Miller in 1978-79 believed that monetary easing would not deepen inflation as long as the unemployment rate was above the full employment level (above 5.5%).</p><p><b>Finally, the Fed's decisions are also influenced by political factors.</b>Burns, who served as chairman from 1970 to 1978, and Miller, who served from 1978 to 79, were both influenced by the then-president and lacked independence, wavering in balancing inflation and economic growth. In hindsight, the Federal Reserve's tolerance of inflation in the 1970s may have been exactly what the ruling party wanted to see: on the one hand, the ruling party did not want the Federal Reserve to damage economic growth or influence votes by curbing inflation; On the other hand, higher inflation is also seen as a hidden tax measure, as rising nominal wages increase the progressiveness of the entire tax system, leading to a significant increase in fiscal revenue. Data shows that the proportion of personal income tax to GDP in the United States increased significantly during periods of high inflation in 1969-70, 1974, and 1979-83.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/85870c4ece63c7cae63758bc6db5a828\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"421\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2.2 Achievements during the Volcker era</b></p><p><b>After 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, absorbed the ideas of the \"monetary school,\" took it upon itself to curb inflation, firmly rate hike and control the money supply. Although it \"created\" an economic recession, it ultimately defeated inflation.</b>In August 1979, Volcker became Chairman of the Federal Reserve. He adopted the views of the \"monetary school\" represented by Friedman. The Federal Reserve under his leadership further clarified the core role of monetary policy in price stability and incorporated the growth rate of money supply (M1) into the monetary policy target. Then, he significantly rate hike the Federal Funds rate to make it higher than the CPI inflation rate in order to achieve the goal of controlling the money supply. In March 1980, Volcker conducted an unwise but brief experiment in credit control (the \"Special Credit Restraint Program\") in an attempt to slow the rate hike, but then restarted monetary policy tightening, which ultimately pushed the Federal Funds rate to a peak of over 20% in mid-1981. Although the significant rate hike brought about an economic recession, it ultimately helped bring down inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7ab3004dd4948baa80533fe718adebaf\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Furthermore, during the Volcker and Greenspan eras, the Federal Reserve established new \"nominal anchors\" to stabilize inflation expectations and rebuild the Fed's credibility, which is also an important background for the return of long-term stability to U.S. prices in the future.</b>In the 1980s, after experiencing \"great stagflation,\" the original expectations of price stability were severely damaged. Even during the Volcker era, when the Federal Reserve set clear money supply targets and firmly raised interest rates, the credibility of monetary policy remained questionable. The public is unclear whether the Federal Reserve can maintain its focus on inflation in the long term and whether it has the ability to influence medium- and long-term price trends. Therefore, Volcker and his successor, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, are more committed to reconstructing stable inflation expectations, making them the \"nominal anchor\" of monetary policy, and ultimately reestablishing the credibility of monetary policy.</p><p><b>This is a complex and lengthy process: Volcker's experience of beating inflation was a good starting point, and then the Federal Reserve shifted from money supply targeting to \"implicit inflation targeting\".</b>In practice, the Federal Reserve focuses on both the \"growth gap\" and the \"inflation expectation gap,\" effectively setting policy interest rates through the Taylor rule, pursuing a stable medium- to long-term inflation target, and achieving stable economic growth. In managing inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve monitors inflation expectations through changes in bond yields, while strengthening communication with the capital market, thereby enhancing the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of market expectations. The post-Volcker monetary policy framework achieved long-term results in price stability, leading to the subsequent Great Moderation (1984-2007).</p><p><b>03. \"Soft landing\" and \"Hard landing\"</b></p><p><b>The United States experienced four economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, which were the result of high inflation, high interest rates, and supply shocks. High inflation has a direct inhibitory effect on consumption and drives Federal Reserve rate hike, further suppressing investment. Therefore, the severity of the recession depends on the severity of inflation and the response of monetary policy, and the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are quite stringent.</b></p><p><b>3.1 Three Major Drivers of Economic Recession</b></p><p><b>According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy experienced four recessions from the 1970s to the 1980s:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>The first round was from January to November 1970 (11 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States declined from 3.2% in 1969 to 0.2% in 1970, but the economy barely shrank. However, the unemployment rate in the United States climbed significantly, from 3.5% in December 1969 to 6.1% in December 1970 (a period high), and remained above 5% for the next 24 months.</p><p></li><li><b>The second round was from December 1973 to March 1975 (16 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States plummeted from 5.6% year-on-year in 1973, and contracted year-on-year for five consecutive quarters, with the deepest year-on-year contraction reaching 2.3% in each quarter. The U.S. unemployment rate has been above 7% for 31 consecutive months, rising from a low of 4.6% in October 1973 to 9.0% in May 1975, before slowly declining.</p><p></li><li><b>The third round was from February to July 1980 (6 months).</b>The real U.S. GDP contracted sharply by 8% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of 1980, but only by 0.8% year-on-year. During this period, the unemployment rate in the United States rose from 6.3% to a peak of 7.8%. In the second half of 1980, the U.S. economy immediately began to recover, with GDP rising sharply by 7.7% quarter-on-quarter in the fourth quarter, and the unemployment rate beginning to decline in August.</p><p></li><li><b>The fourth round was from August 1981 to November 1982 (16 months).</b>。 The real GDP of the United States has contracted year-on-year for four consecutive quarters, with the deepest contraction being 2.6%. The U.S. unemployment rate began to rebound significantly from a low of 7.2% in August 1981, breaking through 8% in November of the same year, reaching a peak of 10.8% in November 1982, and then slowly declining until it fell below 8% in February 1984.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93377c7b4f0d061e8d18147cc001a54a\" tg-width=\"1061\" tg-height=\"483\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><b>One of the drivers of the recession: high inflation.</b>Comparing the economic and inflationary trends at the time, the two showed a very close correlation:<b>The timing of the US economic recession all corresponds to when the CPI inflation rate rises or peaks.</b>For example, the peak of CPI inflation in 1970 coincided with the beginning of a rebound in unemployment and an economic recession. In 1973-75, this round of unemployment rebound and the economy being deemed a recession both occurred after the CPI inflation rate broke 8%. In early 1980, when the CPI inflation rate reached an extremely high level of over 14%, the unemployment rate rebounded significantly and the economy began to decline.<b>If inflation is still rising when a recession occurs, the U.S. economy will continue to decline. The US economy will only begin to recover after the inflation rate has fallen.</b>For example, in the late 1970s, the US economy did not begin to recover until inflation fell below 5%; In 1975, after the inflation rate peaked and fell for a quarter, the US GDP growth rate turned positive quarter-on-quarter and the unemployment rate began to decline.</p><p><b>The direct impact of inflation on the economy is mainly reflected in consumption.</b>Compared to policy interest rates, the negative correlation between the US inflation rate and private consumption growth is more pronounced. Especially in the 1980s, when policy interest rates jumped sharply, the inflation rate had already fallen ahead of schedule, and private consumption also began to rebound, indicating that easing inflation was of significant help to the recovery of consumption.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/157a3ac9e6b19301fad3ca7e2e88c069\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"419\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The second driver of the recession: high interest rates.</b>Overall, the Fed's rate hike had a significant cooling effect on the economy at the time:<b>When the US economy is overheating, rate hike has an immediate effect on cooling the economy:</b>For example, in mid-1973, the U.S. manufacturing PMI exceeded 60, and Federal Reserve rate hike quickly cooled the \"overheated\" economy.<b>While the US economy itself was in a downturn or even recession, rate hike deepened the magnitude of its economic contraction:</b>For example, after policy interest rates peaked in mid-1974, the US economy accelerated its decline, with US GDP shrinking sharply by 3.7% quarter-on-quarter in the third quarter. After the federal funds rate reached a peak of over 17% in March and April 1980, U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 8.0% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of the same year.<b>Conversely, interest rate cuts can help economic recovery:</b>In December 1970, when the policy interest rate fell below the inflation rate, the U.S. economy immediately began to recover. In early 1975, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and brought the policy rate nearly 5 percentage points below the inflation rate, and the U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1975.<b>However, cutting interest rates prematurely and immaturely when inflation is not effectively controlled could result in \"recurring inflation + higher rate hike,\" leading to a deeper recession or delaying a recovery that should have begun earlier.</b>In early 1974, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates, but as inflation continued to rise and the negative impact on the economy persisted, the U.S. economy still entered a recession. In May 1980, the monthly federal funds rate had fallen to around 11% (supplemented by credit controls), and the U.S. economy temporarily broke out of recession territory in August. However, as repeated inflation forced the Federal Reserve to choose more aggressive rate hike, the U.S. economy fell into a new and deeper recession in 1981.</p><p><b>The impact of interest rates on the economy is mainly reflected in investment.</b>Compared to inflation, the negative correlation between policy interest rates and private investment (lagging by one year) is more pronounced. In the latter half of 1980, the Federal Reserve briefly cut interest rates, and a year later, private investment in the United States rebounded significantly. In 1981, when the Federal Reserve resumed significant rate hike, the growth rate of private investment declined significantly a year later, but inflation had also fallen significantly during this period, indicating that private investment was more sensitive to interest rate trends.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d940f253f486815be3e542cd6e173587\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The third driver of the recession: supply shocks.</b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979 dragged down U.S. economic growth in many ways, thus triggering economic recessions.<b>First,</b>As mentioned above, supply shocks raised the CPI inflation rate, and rising consumer prices suppressed aggregate demand. In particular,<b>Supply shocks have triggered rising energy consumption costs and crowded out other consumption.</b>After 1974, the proportion of energy product and service consumption in private consumption in the United States rose from about 6% before the shock to 7-9%, before declining significantly after 1985.<b>Second, supply shocks increased the cost of US oil imports, causing GDP to \"evaporate\".</b>The first oil crisis caused oil prices to rise by about $10 per barrel, and in 1974, the United States' net oil imports were about 6 million barrels per day. We estimate that rising oil prices will drag down US GDP by approximately $21.9 billion by increasing net import costs, dragging down nominal GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points. Similarly, after the second oil crisis, rising net oil import costs dragged down the nominal GDP growth rate of the United States by 2.8 percentage points in 1979.<b>Third, supply shocks have triggered raw material shortages, weakening U.S. industrial production capacity.</b>Following two rounds of supply shocks in the 1970s, the overall U.S. industrial production index declined sharply year-on-year. Comparing the two shocks reveals that during the first shock, the US CPI inflation rate was lower while the PPI inflation rate was higher, resulting in a deeper impact on industrial production. This also reflects that the impact of supply shocks on economic output is more primarily manifested on the \"supply side\".</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bbaa840667be8378540c48fd32436e79\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3.2 What determines the degree of recession?</b></p><p><b>The four rounds of recession mentioned above can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82) according to the degree of GDP contraction and the duration of the recession.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>1970 \"soft landing\"</b>The background is that inflationary pressures are relatively limited. At that time, the highest CPI inflation rate was only 6.2%, and the Federal Reserve did not significantly rate hike, with the highest policy interest rate being only around 9%. The limited inflation was due to two reasons: firstly, it was not shocked by supply, and secondly, it was related to the Nixon administration's price controls.</p><p></li><li><b>\"Soft landing\" in 1980</b>The backdrop is that inflation has peaked and fallen, and the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates in a timely manner. At that time, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once reached a historical high of 14.8%, and the federal funds rate reached 17.6% per month. However, when the recession began and the Federal Reserve quickly cut interest rates and the policy rate dropped sharply to around 9%, the economy quickly began to recover.</p><p></li><li><b>1973-75 \"Hard Landing\"</b>The main reason is that, under supply shocks, the inflation rate continued to rise during the recession, and subsequently the policy interest rate had to rise rapidly in line with inflation (even if the policy interest rate was not significantly higher than the inflation rate).</p><p></li><li><b>\"Hard landing\" in 1981-82</b>The backdrop was that the Federal Reserve was eager to curb inflation and thus adopted very aggressive rate hike measures (Federal Funds rate once reached around 20%). Although the inflation rate quickly began to decline, the policy interest rate remained significantly higher than the inflation rate, slowing down the economic recovery process.</p><p></li></ul><b>Therefore, we can conclude that the requirements for a \"soft landing\" are quite stringent—firstly,</b>Inflationary pressures should not be too high, and the CPI inflation rate may need to fall in a timely manner in the early stages of the recession.<b>Secondly,</b>The Federal Reserve's rate hike should not be too aggressive, and it may even need to cut interest rates in a timely manner when a recession arrives.<b>Finally,</b>If the government intervenes excessively in prices, or if a new supply shock unfortunately occurs, then the \"soft landing\" may only be temporary, and inflation may rebound in the future, making a \"hard landing\" more difficult to avoid.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5c05ee90fc4945e31d8dc59cbb9f3a8c\" tg-width=\"1073\" tg-height=\"367\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>04. Clues to Asset Prices</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s and 1980s, high inflation was the \"biggest enemy\" of the U.S. economy and policies, so the inflation situation became a bellwether for the capital market. During this process, the market understands and digests the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. In addition, the \"Great Stagflation\" caused long-term pain to the economy and markets, resulting in safe-haven assets such as the US dollar performing positively for a considerable period of time.</b></p><p><b>4.1 US Stocks: Inflation is the Biggest Enemy</b></p><p><b>During this period, the US stock market was dominated by inflation, and whenever the inflation rate turned downward, the US stock market immediately rebounded.</b>July 1970, December 1974, and March 1980 corresponded to three peaks in the U.S. CPI inflation rate, and also marked the beginning of the S&P 500 rebound. This may indicate that during periods of high inflation, inflation trends are what the market is most concerned about: as long as inflation remains high, the Federal Reserve is likely to continue tightening, and the US economy will be threatened by both high inflation and high interest rates. As long as inflation declines, even if the economy is temporarily weak, and the market believes that falling prices are conducive to economic recovery and that the Federal Reserve's tightening is expected to ease, the stock market will include recovery expectations.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f3acab3e6f335ccd1d9e96b22ddd4750\" tg-width=\"1069\" tg-height=\"519\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>US stocks are in a bottom out in the middle of a recession, and the magnitude of the correction does not entirely depend on the severity of the recession.</b>In the early stages of the four rounds of recession defined by the NBER, US stocks were under pressure. However, before the recession ended, US stocks were often the first to rebound as monetary policy expectations eased, inflationary pressures began to ease, and market recovery expectations strengthened. In other words,<b>The \"policy bottom\" precedes the \"market bottom,\" and the \"market bottom\" precedes the \"economic bottom.\"</b>Data shows that the bottoms of the S&P 500 index all occurred during recessions.</p><p><b>However, the magnitude of the correction in US stocks does not entirely depend on the severity of the recession:</b>During the \"soft landings\" of 1970 and 1980, and the \"hard landings\" of 1981-82, the S&P 500 index fell by no more than 20%. Only during the \"hard landing\" of 1973-75 did the S&P 500 index fall by nearly 40%. In terms of the magnitude of the rebound, after four rounds of recession and a correction in US stocks, the rebound in US stocks has been relatively strong, with the S&P 500 index rebounding from its lows by more than 30% in both cases.</p><p><b>The logic behind this may lie in:</b>The market after the \"soft landing\" remains optimistic overall. Although the market after the \"hard landing\" is not as optimistic, the cost-effectiveness of US stocks can still attract capital inflows due to the low \"base\" before. This means that regardless of the severity of the recession, as long as you find the bottom and moderately \"lean forward\" to invest in US stocks, you may be able to obtain good returns.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/164eaafd25fa17da2d93917b48fdcdc5\" tg-width=\"1063\" tg-height=\"500\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The Federal Reserve is not the \"eternal enemy\" of US stocks.</b>Comparing the performance of US stocks after 1970 and 1980, even though the US CPI inflation rate was higher, the Federal Reserve's rate hike was more aggressive, and the recession was not weak after 1980, the overall performance of US stocks was significantly better than in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the S&P 500 index remained almost sideways amidst fluctuations, while after 1980, the S&P 500 index maintained a volatile upward trend. In particular, compared to 1973-75 and 1981-82, both were \"hard landings,\" but the latter saw a smaller decline and a larger rebound in US stocks. The biggest difference between the two periods is that<b>The latter, with the Federal Reserve tightening more strongly, may have played a more significant role in \"manufacturing\" the recession.</b>During the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hike, the inflation rate declined significantly: on the one hand, it alleviated the suppression of economic growth by high inflation, and on the other hand, the market had more confidence in the Federal Reserve, which in turn led to stronger recovery expectations and higher risk appetite. Furthermore, after 1980, \"Reaganism\" entered the historical stage, and after the market was fully and painfully cleared, American productivity increased rapidly. Therefore, the US stock market rebounded more strongly, driven by both the decline in policy interest rates after inflation was brought under control and the profit growth of listed companies. From this perspective, inflation is the \"biggest enemy\" of US stocks, while the Federal Reserve is not; The Federal Reserve, which has the ability to curb inflation, has ultimately become a \"friend\" of US stocks!</p><p><b>4.2 US Treasury Bonds: Dancing with Monetary Policy</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s, the US Treasury market experienced a prolonged bear market, with high inflation and high interest rates combined to drive up US Treasury yields.</b>However, the volatility of the 10-year US Treasury yields is significantly less than that of the CPI inflation rate and policy interest rate. It is worth mentioning that the correlation between the US economic recession and US Treasury yields is not obvious: around the four rounds of recession in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields declined in the first round, fluctuated upwards in the second round, rose sharply in the third round, and fluctuated upwards in the fourth round. This may reflect the evolution of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy logic, namely, the increasing emphasis on inflation and the weakening of its consideration of the economy. Then<b>Over time, the market trades less for \"recession\" and more for \"tightening.\"</b>It wasn't until after the third quarter of 1982, when the CPI inflation rate was below 5% and GDP contracted year-on-year, that the market believed the Federal Reserve could wholeheartedly cut interest rates, and US Treasury yields declined significantly.</p><p><b>In the 1980s, the trend of the 10-year US Treasury yields became more closely related to the trend of policy interest rates.</b>From 1980 to 1981, the US CPI inflation rate showed a downward trend, but the US Treasury yields rose rapidly over the next 10 years, mainly driven by the strong tightening of monetary policy. After 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields closely aligned with the trend of policy interest rate fluctuations, reflecting the effectiveness of monetary policy reforms during the Volcker era, namely, the Federal Reserve's driving force on bond interest rates increased significantly.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9d465d535d3e18340e29dfe32d95faea\" tg-width=\"1068\" tg-height=\"502\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Although the 10-year US Treasury yields and policy interest rates \"dance together,\" the fluctuations are smaller.</b>Before the 1970s, the absolute levels and trends of US Treasury yields and Federal Funds rate were very similar over the past 10 years. In the 1970s, when high inflation arrived and the Federal Reserve rate hike, the 10-year US Treasury yields would also rise, but the increase was smaller, and then \"underperformed\" the policy interest rate. The reasons are: on the one hand, the emergence of high inflation and high interest rates has reduced market risk appetite, and US Treasury bonds have played a certain safe-haven role; On the other hand, due to concerns about economic growth, the market doubts the sustainability of high interest rates, which in turn suppresses medium- and long-term US Treasury yields (the maturity premium of US Treasury bonds is negative). After inflation subsided and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, the 10-year US Treasury yields also fell, but the magnitude was still limited, causing US Treasury yields to \"outperform\" policy interest rates. The reason for this phenomenon may be the rise in inflation expectations. In fact, after 1983, the 10-year decline in US Treasury yields was insufficient, which once became a new problem facing the Federal Reserve: the US inflation rate had fallen to around 2%, but because market inflation expectations had not fallen in time, bond market interest rates fell slowly, hindering economic recovery. Later, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, began to regard bond market interest rates as a benchmark for inflation expectations and paid more attention to the management of inflation expectations. Only then did the 10-year US Treasury yields trend further align with policy interest rates.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/73d7be6ac6bef4e338dc445e6ab9169f\" tg-width=\"1065\" tg-height=\"503\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>4.3. US Dollar: Multiple factors contribute to a strong dollar</b></p><p><b>Factors such as the Federal Reserve's rate hike, rising market demand for safe-haven assets, and the impact on non-US economies collectively contributed to the strong dollar in 1981-84.</b>In the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused the US dollar to depreciate rapidly, and the US dollar exchange rate was not strongly correlated with the US economic and monetary cycle during this period. From 1981 to 1984, the US dollar exchange rate continued to strengthen, and the the US Dollar Index rose from around 85 in the second half of 1980 to a historical peak of 160. The strong dollar did not come to an end until Plaza Accord signed it in 1985.</p><p><b>How should we understand the strong dollar during this period?</b>First, after 1980, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, strictly controlled the money supply, leading to an increase in the scarcity of the dollar. Second, in 1981-82, the US economy fell into recession due to the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hike, and the US stock market experienced a significant correction. Economic and market risks stimulated the safe-haven attributes of the US dollar. Third, in 1983-84, the US economy bid farewell to high inflation and entered a strong recovery, while the Federal Reserve's policy interest rate and US Treasury yields remained relatively high. The US dollar exchange rate continued to strengthen during this period: on the one hand, market confidence in the Federal Reserve increased; On the other hand, the spillover effects of the Federal Reserve's previous tightening on non-US economies became apparent (such as the deep debt crisis in Latin America in 1982-85), which made dollar assets highly attractive.</p><p>It is worth mentioning that,<b>During the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hike, both the US Dollar Index and US Treasury yields showed an upward trend.</b>However,<b>The reaction of the US dollar exchange rate lagged that of US Treasury yields:</b>For example, in June 1980, the 10-year US Treasury yields had already begun to rise rapidly, while the rise in the US Dollar Index lagged behind by about 3 months. In June 1984, the 10-year US Treasury yields began to decline due to market expectations of interest rate cuts, but the decline in the US Dollar Index lagged by nine months.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/61242bb3f7016cf966b35fefe3930648\" tg-width=\"1067\" tg-height=\"452\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>05. New insights for the present</b></p><p><b>1. The causes of this round of US inflation share many similarities with those of the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited.</b></p><p>Similar to the 1970s, the current high inflation in the United States is also the result of a combination of factors, including monetary and fiscal easing, the Federal Reserve's slow action, and supply shocks. But in comparison,<b>We tend to think that US inflation will not run out of control as it did then:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This time, the US government did not implement harsh price controls like the Nixon administration did. The balancing effect of price signals on supply and demand did not disappear, reducing the risk of future inflation recurrences.</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>The current risk of a \"wage-price\" spiral in the United States is relatively lower, partly due to the still relatively stable medium- to long-term inflation expectations, and partly due to the long-term weakening of the power of US labor unions.</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>The United States is currently more capable of digesting the \"oil crisis,\" especially after the shale oil revolution in 2010. The proportion of energy consumption in total private consumption in the United States has decreased, and the United States has also transformed from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. As a result, the transmission of oil prices to the core inflation rate in the United States has decreased. Therefore, even though the current year-on-year growth rate of the energy sub-item of the US CPI is as high as 40%, reaching the level of the two oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the core CPI inflation rate is significantly lower than at that time.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e9d6130cfa6c71161fdc10b5eaa79c0\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"411\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2. Although the Federal Reserve has also made \"mistakes\" in this round, it has taken the initiative in combating inflation.</b></p><p>The \"capriciousness\" of monetary policy and the lack of market confidence in it were important backgrounds for the recurring stagflation in the 1970s and 1980s. In comparison,<b>The Federal Reserve now has more initiative, and even though it underestimated the sustainability of inflation in 2021 (the \"inflation temporary theory\"), this mistake may still have room to be reversed:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>In understanding and addressing \"stagflation,\" the Federal Reserve is no longer \"crossing the river by feeling the stones,\" and its monetary policy has long since clearly defined the goal of \"price stability.\" Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve has declared that \"price stability\" is a prerequisite for \"maximum employment\" and regards curbing inflation as the primary task of monetary policy.</p><p></li><li><b>Secondly,</b>Since the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve has had a stronger ability to monitor inflation expectations (such as the emergence of inflation-protected bonds after 2000), is more efficient in communicating with the market, and has established a relatively good reputation. Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve's tightening signals have significantly raised the nominal interest rate on US Treasury bonds, and the quick response of the capital market reflects the credibility of monetary policy. Current U.S. inflation expectations have not \"deanchored,\" with the ten-year inflation expectation monitored by the Cleveland Fed model not exceeding 2.5%, far below the 4-5% level in the 1980s.</p><p></li><li><b>Finally,</b>The Federal Reserve is now more independent. Currently, inflation is a common \"enemy\" faced by the Biden administration and the Federal Reserve, and the Fed's tightening is supported by the president. Even if economic pressures increase in the future and the president puts pressure on the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve is expected to be relatively firm in defending its credibility. Just as Powell's Federal Reserve held four rate hike in 2018, despite then-President Trump's criticism.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aeb68357b44663ea8caedbf43793c2db\" tg-width=\"1074\" tg-height=\"436\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3. The current US economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\".</b></p><p>In the 1970s and 1980s, when the US CPI inflation rate rose above 5%, the economic recession arrived as expected. Compared to the current situation:</p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This year, the US CPI inflation rate reached a peak of 9.1%, which not only exceeded the level that triggered the previous recession, but also surpassed the level during the US economic \"soft landing\" in 1970.</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>The Federal Reserve is currently showing great determination to curb inflation and may maintain policy interest rates at a \"sufficiently restrictive level\" for an extended period of time, even at the cost of an economic recession (see our previous report, \"The Fed's Credibility Defense\"). This means that, similar to the Volcker era of 1981-82, the Fed's tightening efforts this time may be enough to \"create\" a recession;</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>The risk of recurring inflation in the future cannot be ruled out at present. If a new supply shock unfortunately occurs in the future, or if the Federal Reserve's actual tightening efforts are insufficient (e.g., if the Federal Reserve stops tightening prematurely or even cuts interest rates when the US economy actually enters a recession, political pressure rises, or financial risks occur in the future), then US inflation may still fluctuate, leading to a larger recession.</p><p></li></ul><b>4. The price trends of major asset classes in this round may be quite similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s.</b></p><p><b>1) US stocks: Inflation remains the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the current inflation trend is also strongly correlated with the performance of US stocks.</b>In the first half of this year, as the US CPI inflation rate continued to rise, US stocks ushered in a deep correction; From mid-June to mid-August, commodity prices and inflation expectations cooled, leading to a temporary rebound in US stocks. Since late August, as high inflation has persisted beyond expectations and the Federal Reserve's policy stance has become more hawkish, US stocks have increased their focus on monetary policy, triggering a new round of \"tightening panic\".</p><p></li><li><b>The US stock market may remain under pressure for some time to come, similar to the period in 1981-82 when Volcker fought inflation and \"created\" a recession.</b>In 1981-82, although the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to decline, the Federal Reserve's tightening impacted the economy and stock market. Similarly, the Federal Reserve seems to want to return to the \"Volcker era\" and will inevitably ensure that inflation falls, even at the cost of a recession. Currently, US inflation remains high, the economy has not yet experienced a substantial recession, and the market has not fully priced in the recession. There may still be room for adjustment in US stocks in the future. Historically, US stocks may still fall in the early stages of an economic recession, and only after monetary policy begins to ease in the later stages of the recession do they experience a sustained rebound.</p><p></li><li><b>However, the Federal Reserve will not be the \"eternal enemy\" of US stocks. If the Fed successfully helps bring down inflation, the correction in US stocks may not be too deep.</b>When Volcker \"manufactured\" the recession in 1981-92, the correction in US stocks was relatively limited and did not fall below the bottom of early 1980. While the Federal Reserve's vigorous fight against inflation may bring short-term pain, it can prevent recurring long-term pain. Considering that the current inflation situation is more optimistic than in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Federal Reserve's actions are not too passive, the current correction in US stocks may not be too deep, and the rebound may be earlier than historical experience.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f004d3c8a3173e8965e08861dace942\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2) US Treasury bonds: Monetary policy remains the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when a recession materializes. It will have to wait until monetary policy clearly begins to ease.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the core influencing factor for US Treasury yields in the current decade is monetary policy.</b>The experience of the 1970s and 1980s was that the bond market oscillated between \"recession trading\" and \"tightening trading\". However, as the Federal Reserve becomes more determined in its fight against inflation, the bond market is trading less in \"recession\" and more in \"tightening\". In July of this year, the 10-year US Treasury yields fell significantly due to cooling inflation expectations and rising recession expectations. However, since late August, as the Federal Reserve's policy stance has become more hawkish, the market has become more focused on tightening. As a result, the 10-year US Treasury yields has continued to rebound in the past 10 years and has broken through 4%, exceeding the high of 3.5% in mid-June.</p><p></li><li><b>If the Federal Reserve continues to tighten during the recession, then US Treasury yields may not decline quickly in the early 10 years of the recession.</b>Just as in the early days of the US economic recession in 1981-82, even though the US CPI inflation rate had fallen significantly from its peak, it was still far from the 2% target. Monetary policy was not relaxed, and US Treasury yields remained at a high level for 10 years. We expect that even if the U.S. economy begins to recess in the first half of 2023, the Federal Reserve may choose to stick to tightening and not cut interest rates, and the bond market may not trade for a recession too early.</p><p></li><li><b>A decline in 10-year US Treasury yields may require a substantial drop in policy interest rates.</b>In the second half of 1982, when the US CPI inflation rate fell below 5% and the economic recession was deep, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates sharply, and the US Treasury bull market truly began. It should also be noted that the starting point of the policy interest rate decline at that time was earlier than the 10-year US Treasury yields, and the decline was also deeper. This means that US Treasury yields may only decline significantly in 10 years after monetary policy clearly begins to ease.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/18e234a92705cc42b9b876c30857ee92\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"410\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3) US Dollar: The \"strong dollar\" may last for a long time, and a decline in the US dollar exchange rate may require a pullback in US Treasury yields.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>In the medium term, the logic behind the current \"strong dollar\" is very similar to that of the 1980s.</b>In 1980-84, the US Dollar Index reached its \"historical peak,\" and even during this period, the US dollar exchange rate remained strong for a long time. Currently, the logic supporting the US dollar is very similar to that of the 1980s: the US economy has a clear advantage over non-US regions, and the Federal Reserve is more confident in tightening than other developed economies. Looking ahead, even if the US economy moves from \"stagflation\" to \"recession,\" financial risks to non-US economies may not be eliminated (as can be seen from the fluctuations in European and Japanese bond and currency markets this year). On the contrary, market trust in US dollar assets will increase (for example, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have already weakened). Therefore, for at least the next 1-2 years, the fluctuation center of the the US Dollar Index is expected to remain higher than the pre-COVID-19 level.</p><p></li><li><b>In the short term, US Treasury yields may be a \"leading indicator\" for judging the trend of the US dollar.</b>In 1980, US Treasury yields began its upward cycle 10 years earlier than the US Dollar Index; From 1984 to 1985, US Treasury yields declined 10 years earlier than the US Dollar Index. In fact, past market performance has largely confirmed US Treasury yields' leading position over the US Dollar Index:<b>the US Dollar Index usually also peaks and falls 1-3 months after the 10-year US Treasury yields peaks and falls.</b>As mentioned earlier, the start of this round of US Treasury bull market may need to wait until the recession materializes and monetary policy eases, after which signs of the US Dollar Index peaking and falling may become increasingly clear.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa0454ffd0dbe555b8d8d2e59c3c5c0d\" tg-width=\"1075\" tg-height=\"408\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b><i>Risk Warning:</i></b></p><p><b><i>1. The resilience of the US economy has fallen short of expectations.</i></b><i>Although there is still room for recovery in the US service sector, in an environment of high inflation and high interest rates, insufficient consumer confidence may suppress actual consumption, resulting in weaker economic growth than the benchmark expectation. With the Federal Reserve's rate hike and demand cooling, the pace of cooling in the US job market may exceed expectations.</i></p><p><b><i>2. New supply shocks occur.</i></b><i>If new supply shocks occur in the future and raise international prices of commodities such as energy and food again, the pressure of \"stagflation\" in the United States may increase significantly, and the Federal Reserve may have to \"create\" a recession to curb inflation, turning market sentiment pessimistic.</i></p><p><b><i>3. The Federal Reserve's tightening efforts are insufficient or too strong.</i></b><i>If the Federal Reserve's insufficient tightening causes inflation to fluctuate, the Fed's subsequent cost of controlling inflation will be greater. If the Federal Reserve's tightening efforts are significantly stronger than market expectations, the risk of market volatility may increase and could ultimately threaten the real economy.</i></p><p><b><i>4. Economic and financial risks in non-US regions exceeded expectations, etc.</i></b><i>Currently, economic and financial risks in large economies such as Europe and Asia are showing signs of rising. If a major economic and financial risk event occurs in the future, the US economy and market may be affected.</i></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49ae9add1640b1e283a53b027b0227c7\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"868\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc83db9c8a7fe6fe220fca7ca329cf0d\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"513\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/580ee36c20670ad5f1a888d715380e06\" tg-width=\"999\" tg-height=\"928\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p></body></html></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Rethinking the US \"Great Stagflation\"! Also on the Implications for Current Asset Prices</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nRethinking the US \"Great Stagflation\"! Also on the Implications for Current Asset Prices\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/70\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/86f6d9605fc344e28cd4247a93dcdc2b);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">钟正生经济分析 </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2022-10-02 09:35</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body><b>I. The complexity of high inflation.</b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s were extremely complex: First, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, harsh price controls and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively extinguish inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks, represented by the two oil crises, triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the long-term excessive inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations, triggered a wage-price spiral, and deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</p><p><b>II. The Federal Reserve's \"merits\" and \"demerits\".</b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve's tightening was not decisive enough for several reasons: First, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation was a \"non-monetary phenomenon\"; Secondly, the Federal Reserve's primary goal at the time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\"; Finally, the Fed's decisions are also influenced by political factors. After 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, absorbed the ideas of the \"monetary school,\" took it upon itself to curb inflation, firmly uphold rate hike, and control the money supply. Subsequently, the Federal Reserve spent a considerable period of time working to stabilize inflation expectations, reshaping its credibility.</p><p><b>III. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\".</b>The United States experienced four rounds of economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, which can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82). These were the result of the combined effects of high inflation, high interest rates, and supply shocks. However, the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are quite stringent: First, the CPI inflation rate may need to fall in a timely manner in the early stages of the recession; Secondly, the Federal Reserve's rate hike should not be too aggressive, and it may even need to cut interest rates in a timely manner when a recession arrives; Finally, if new supply shocks occur, a \"hard landing\" may be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><b>IV. Clues to asset prices.</b>In the 1970s and 1980s, inflation became a bellwether for the capital market. The US CPI inflation rate has peaked three times, and the US stock market has bottomed out in all of them. However, during this process, the market understands and digests the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. Over time, the US Treasury market trades less in \"recession\" and more in \"tightening\". In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. Even after the Great Stagflation ended, safe-haven assets such as the US dollar continued to perform positively for a considerable period of time.</p><p><b>V. New insights for the present.</b>First, the causes of this round of US inflation have many similarities to those of the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited; Second, although the Federal Reserve has also made \"mistakes\" in this round, it has taken a more proactive approach in combating inflation; Third, the current US economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\"; Fourth, the current round of asset price trends may bear a strong resemblance to those of the 1970s and 1980s:<b>1）</b>US stocks: Inflation remains the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.<b>2）</b>US Treasury bonds: Monetary policy remains the core influencing factor, and a decline may not occur immediately when a recession materializes; it will have to wait until monetary policy is clearly eased.<b>3）</b>US Dollar: The \"strong dollar\" may last for a long time, and a decline in the dollar may require a US Treasury yields pullback.</p><p><i>Risk warning: The US economy is weaker than expected, new supply shocks are emerging, and non-US financial risks are rising.</i></p><p>Since 2022, the US CPI inflation rate has once broken through 9%, real GDP has contracted quarter-on-quarter for two consecutive quarters, the stagflationary characteristics of the economy have become more pronounced, and the capital market has also experienced significant fluctuations. Since the Jackson Hole meeting in late August, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly mentioned \"historical experience\" on various occasions, indicating that the current U.S. economic environment is very similar to that of the 1970s and 1980s. The Federal Reserve will also fully learn from that experience, doing what it can and cannot do, in order to help the United States overcome \"stagflation\".</p><p>What are the current inflationary pressures in the United States? How will monetary policy respond? Can the US economy still achieve a \"soft landing\"? When will the capital market usher in a \"spring\"? In this report, we revisit the performance of inflation, monetary policy, economic growth, and asset prices during the Great Stagflation period in the United States from the 1970s to the 1980s, with questions about the present, and attempt to understand the logic and patterns within them, in order to provide inspiration for judging the direction of the US economy, monetary policy, and market in the near future.</p><p><b>01. The complexity of high inflation</b></p><p><b>The causes of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s were extremely complex: First, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, harsh price controls and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively extinguish inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks, represented by the two oil crises, triggered cost-driven inflation; Finally, the long-term excessive inflation rate has destabilized inflation expectations, triggered a wage-price spiral, and deepened the stubbornness of inflation.</b></p><p><b>From 1969 to 1982, the United States fell into a high inflation crisis, with the CPI inflation rate generally above 5%, reaching as high as 14.8%.</b>The year-on-year growth rate of the US CPI has been rising rapidly at a rate of over 3% since 1968. In March 1969, the CPI broke through 5% year-on-year, thus beginning a 13-year era of \"high inflation\". Between 1969 and 1982, the year-on-year growth rate of the US CPI experienced three peaks, with the peaks occurring in January 1970 (6.2%), December 1974 (12.3%), and March 1980 (14.8%). In February 1982, the CPI fell below 5% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0135dfd0a18c15e058312be783380d12\" tg-width=\"1066\" tg-height=\"490\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1965-70, blind fiscal and monetary expansion led to rising inflation.</b>With the end of post-World War II economic reconstruction and the rise of European and Asian economies, the growth momentum of the US economy has weakened, but blind policy stimulus has led to a significant overheating of the economy. From 1965 to 1970, the real GDP growth rate of the United States consistently exceeded the potential growth rate, and the output gap (the difference between real GDP and potential GDP) accounted for as much as 3-6% of potential GDP. In other words, 3-6 percentage points of the US economic growth rate at the time was driven by policy stimulus. During this period, the natural unemployment rate in the United States was 5.6-5.9%, but the actual unemployment rate remained generally below 4%. At the time, fiscal stimulus played a stronger role than money. U.S. federal spending as a percentage of GDP rose by 3.2 percentage points between 1966 and 1968, and the deficit ratio widened from 0.2% in 1965 to 2.8% in 1968. In 1968, the U.S. government began to worry about fiscal balance, and then-President Johnson signed the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 in June, supplementing fiscal revenue through tax increases. In August of the same year, the Federal Reserve \"technically cut interest rates\" to offset the impact of tax increases, adding fuel to the overheating of the economy.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fb7621fa84eb213f441091515980951c\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"426\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In 1971-74, harsh price controls turned \"short-term pain\" into \"long-term pain\".</b>In August 1971, the Nixon administration imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze. However, the scope of price controls continued to expand until the U.S. government completely abolished its intervention in prices in 1974. During this period, except in special circumstances, all price increases for goods and services require government approval. In mid-1972, the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 3%. This price control is considered a special case in U.S. economic history of comprehensive government intervention in prices during peacetime, and it is also considered a failed attempt. This is because, while price controls curbed price increases, they also severely dampened the enthusiasm of manufacturing enterprises, resulting in insufficient supply of goods and laying the groundwork for the subsequent deterioration of inflation. In 1974, Nixon stepped down due to the Watergate scandal, and the new President Carter took office, gradually weakening price controls. Ironically, both the Nixon and Carter administrations attempted to control prices through verbal \"admonitions.\" For example, when Carter first took office, he encouraged people to buy \"cheap goods\": \"Dare to show off to others that you specifically choose cheap goods and be proud of it.\" These admonitions were almost futile in controlling prices. The US CPI inflation rate broke through 5% again in April 1973 and then rose all the way to a stage high of 12.3% in December 1974.</p><p><b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979 demonstrated the destructive power of supply shocks on American prices.</b>In 1973, the former Soviet Union suffered a grain harvest failure due to severe weather, and subsequently entered the international market to purchase large quantities of grain, triggering the most serious food crisis since World War II. At the end of 1973, the year-on-year growth rate of the US food CPI once exceeded 20%. From October 1973 to March 1974, the first oil crisis broke out: members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, led by Saudi Arabia, announced an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, with the United States bearing the brunt. The average price of World Bank crude oil jumped from $2.70 per barrel in September 1973 to $13 per barrel in early 1974, an increase of nearly 500%. From March to September 1974, the year-on-year growth rate of the U.S. energy CPI exceeded 30%. From early 1979 to early 1980, the second oil crisis broke out: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, followed by the \"Iran-Iraq War,\" which led to a sharp decline in global oil production. The World Bank's international oil price rose from less than $15 per barrel in December 1978 to over $40 per barrel in November 1979. In March 1980, the US energy CPI peaked at 47.1% year-on-year, and the US CPI subsequently reached a peak of 14.8% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/368b46087ff151100ed782e7aa94b78d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1980, after the headline inflation rate in the United States continued to overshoot, inflation expectations spiraled out of control, and with the help of labor unions, a \"wage-price spiral\" gradually formed.</b>After years of CPI inflation exceeding 2% or even 5%, American residents have lost confidence in prices, and inflation expectations have risen. At that time, neither the Federal Reserve nor the market had a relatively limited understanding and tracking of inflation expectations. The widely cited University of Michigan survey and the Cleveland Federal Reserve model were not forecasted until around 1980. The earliest tool for monitoring inflation expectations in The United States was The Livingston Survey, which was created in 1946 and summarized inflation forecasts from businesses, governments, banks, and academia. The survey shows that inflation expectations in the United States have gradually risen since 1970, especially after the two oil crises, when inflation expectations also rose sharply along with the headline inflation rate. The negative impact of inflation expectations on prices is mainly transmitted through wages: workers demand higher wages, which in turn increases residents' spending power and businesses' cost pressures, which in turn contributes to rising prices, forming a \"wage-price spiral\".<b>In particular, in the 1970s, American unions were very powerful, and wage demands were transmitted relatively smoothly:</b>According to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at that time, union members accounted for nearly 30% of the total number of employees in the United States, and there were 200-400 strikes involving more than a thousand people each year (this number has been consistently below 30 since 2000). From mid-1976 to mid-1978, the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell to around 5-7%, but the average hourly wage growth rate of U.S. non-farm and non-managerial employees reached 6-8% year-on-year, consistently exceeding the CPI inflation rate. The stickiness of wage increases hindered a further decline in inflation and paved the way for a subsequent rebound in inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa062f9510e45fda47f5e682ec9ba17b\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve's policy response was relatively passive, consistently \"lagging behind the curve\" and failing to effectively curb inflation.</b>Before 1980, the US policy interest rate and inflation trends were highly synchronized, reflecting that the Federal Reserve had been \"lagging behind the curve\" and \"catching up with the curve\" for a considerable period of time. In May 1969, three months after the inflation rate broke through 5%, the U.S. policy interest rate began to rise significantly and exceeded the inflation rate by more than 3 percentage points. After that, the inflation rate continued to rise for about six months before it began to fall. In the second half of 1973, with the U.S. inflation rate still rising, the Federal Reserve was forced to cut interest rates under economic pressure, which accelerated the rise in inflation. In 1978, the U.S. policy rate was basically in line with the inflation rate and continued to rise step by step until December 1978, when the monthly federal funds rate broke through 10% and was 1 percentage point higher than the inflation rate. However, the policy rate soon began to lag behind the inflation rate again. Later, when the US policy interest rate was significantly higher than the spot inflation rate, inflation fell significantly, and the Federal Reserve gained the initiative in curbing inflation: after 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, raised interest rates sharply to combat inflation. In mid-1981, the US policy interest rate peaked at over 19%, and in October of the same year, the CPI declined both month-on-month and year-on-year. Since then, Federal Funds rate has remained 4-9 percentage points higher than the CPI inflation rate, and the inflation rate has continued to decline.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/707eeb51701422548c5e1b935b53479d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>02. The Federal Reserve's \"Mistakes\" and \"Merits\"</b></p><p><b>In 1970-1979, the Federal Reserve's tightening was not decisive enough, due to both insufficient understanding of the relationship between inflation and monetary policy and a lack of independence in monetary policy. After 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, absorbed the ideas of the \"monetary school,\" took it upon itself to curb inflation, firmly uphold rate hike, and control the money supply. Subsequently, the Federal Reserve spent a considerable period of time working to stabilize inflation expectations, reshaping its credibility.</b></p><p><b>2.1 Reasons for the Federal Reserve's hesitation</b></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve continued to \"lag behind the curve\" for a variety of reasons.</b></p><p><b>First, the Federal Reserve once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon\".</b>At the time, the Federal Reserve disagreed on the causes of high inflation and tended to believe that inflation was mainly caused by non-monetary factors, leading to a passive response in monetary policy. For example, in 1970, the Federal Reserve, led by Burns, believed that union power had triggered cost-driven inflation and then advocated using \"income policy\" regulation rather than tightening the money supply. This also prompted the wage and price freezes later implemented by the Nixon administration. In 1974, Burns again argued that \"inappropriate fiscal discipline\" was the main cause of inflation.</p><p><b>Secondly, the Federal Reserve's primary goal at the time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\".</b>Before the 1970s, Keynesian ideas dominated the logic of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve focused on aggregate demand management and firmly believed in the existence of the Phillips curve (the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation). Therefore, the Federal Reserve sets the primary goal of monetary policy at achieving \"full employment,\" hoping to maintain a low and stable unemployment rate. Then, when the unemployment rate rises, the balance of monetary policy tilts more towards the labor market. When \"stagnation\" and \"inflation\" occurred simultaneously, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation would not continue to deteriorate. For example, the Federal Reserve led by Miller in 1978-79 believed that monetary easing would not deepen inflation as long as the unemployment rate was above the full employment level (above 5.5%).</p><p><b>Finally, the Fed's decisions are also influenced by political factors.</b>Burns, who served as chairman from 1970 to 1978, and Miller, who served from 1978 to 79, were both influenced by the then-president and lacked independence, wavering in balancing inflation and economic growth. In hindsight, the Federal Reserve's tolerance of inflation in the 1970s may have been exactly what the ruling party wanted to see: on the one hand, the ruling party did not want the Federal Reserve to damage economic growth or influence votes by curbing inflation; On the other hand, higher inflation is also seen as a hidden tax measure, as rising nominal wages increase the progressiveness of the entire tax system, leading to a significant increase in fiscal revenue. Data shows that the proportion of personal income tax to GDP in the United States increased significantly during periods of high inflation in 1969-70, 1974, and 1979-83.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/85870c4ece63c7cae63758bc6db5a828\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"421\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2.2 Achievements during the Volcker era</b></p><p><b>After 1979, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, absorbed the ideas of the \"monetary school,\" took it upon itself to curb inflation, firmly rate hike and control the money supply. Although it \"created\" an economic recession, it ultimately defeated inflation.</b>In August 1979, Volcker became Chairman of the Federal Reserve. He adopted the views of the \"monetary school\" represented by Friedman. The Federal Reserve under his leadership further clarified the core role of monetary policy in price stability and incorporated the growth rate of money supply (M1) into the monetary policy target. Then, he significantly rate hike the Federal Funds rate to make it higher than the CPI inflation rate in order to achieve the goal of controlling the money supply. In March 1980, Volcker conducted an unwise but brief experiment in credit control (the \"Special Credit Restraint Program\") in an attempt to slow the rate hike, but then restarted monetary policy tightening, which ultimately pushed the Federal Funds rate to a peak of over 20% in mid-1981. Although the significant rate hike brought about an economic recession, it ultimately helped bring down inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7ab3004dd4948baa80533fe718adebaf\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Furthermore, during the Volcker and Greenspan eras, the Federal Reserve established new \"nominal anchors\" to stabilize inflation expectations and rebuild the Fed's credibility, which is also an important background for the return of long-term stability to U.S. prices in the future.</b>In the 1980s, after experiencing \"great stagflation,\" the original expectations of price stability were severely damaged. Even during the Volcker era, when the Federal Reserve set clear money supply targets and firmly raised interest rates, the credibility of monetary policy remained questionable. The public is unclear whether the Federal Reserve can maintain its focus on inflation in the long term and whether it has the ability to influence medium- and long-term price trends. Therefore, Volcker and his successor, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, are more committed to reconstructing stable inflation expectations, making them the \"nominal anchor\" of monetary policy, and ultimately reestablishing the credibility of monetary policy.</p><p><b>This is a complex and lengthy process: Volcker's experience of beating inflation was a good starting point, and then the Federal Reserve shifted from money supply targeting to \"implicit inflation targeting\".</b>In practice, the Federal Reserve focuses on both the \"growth gap\" and the \"inflation expectation gap,\" effectively setting policy interest rates through the Taylor rule, pursuing a stable medium- to long-term inflation target, and achieving stable economic growth. In managing inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve monitors inflation expectations through changes in bond yields, while strengthening communication with the capital market, thereby enhancing the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of market expectations. The post-Volcker monetary policy framework achieved long-term results in price stability, leading to the subsequent Great Moderation (1984-2007).</p><p><b>03. \"Soft landing\" and \"Hard landing\"</b></p><p><b>The United States experienced four economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, which were the result of high inflation, high interest rates, and supply shocks. High inflation has a direct inhibitory effect on consumption and drives Federal Reserve rate hike, further suppressing investment. Therefore, the severity of the recession depends on the severity of inflation and the response of monetary policy, and the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are quite stringent.</b></p><p><b>3.1 Three Major Drivers of Economic Recession</b></p><p><b>According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy experienced four recessions from the 1970s to the 1980s:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>The first round was from January to November 1970 (11 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States declined from 3.2% in 1969 to 0.2% in 1970, but the economy barely shrank. However, the unemployment rate in the United States climbed significantly, from 3.5% in December 1969 to 6.1% in December 1970 (a period high), and remained above 5% for the next 24 months.</p><p></li><li><b>The second round was from December 1973 to March 1975 (16 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States plummeted from 5.6% year-on-year in 1973, and contracted year-on-year for five consecutive quarters, with the deepest year-on-year contraction reaching 2.3% in each quarter. The U.S. unemployment rate has been above 7% for 31 consecutive months, rising from a low of 4.6% in October 1973 to 9.0% in May 1975, before slowly declining.</p><p></li><li><b>The third round was from February to July 1980 (6 months).</b>The real U.S. GDP contracted sharply by 8% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of 1980, but only by 0.8% year-on-year. During this period, the unemployment rate in the United States rose from 6.3% to a peak of 7.8%. In the second half of 1980, the U.S. economy immediately began to recover, with GDP rising sharply by 7.7% quarter-on-quarter in the fourth quarter, and the unemployment rate beginning to decline in August.</p><p></li><li><b>The fourth round was from August 1981 to November 1982 (16 months).</b>。 The real GDP of the United States has contracted year-on-year for four consecutive quarters, with the deepest contraction being 2.6%. The U.S. unemployment rate began to rebound significantly from a low of 7.2% in August 1981, breaking through 8% in November of the same year, reaching a peak of 10.8% in November 1982, and then slowly declining until it fell below 8% in February 1984.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93377c7b4f0d061e8d18147cc001a54a\" tg-width=\"1061\" tg-height=\"483\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><b>One of the drivers of the recession: high inflation.</b>Comparing the economic and inflationary trends at the time, the two showed a very close correlation:<b>The timing of the US economic recession all corresponds to when the CPI inflation rate rises or peaks.</b>For example, the peak of CPI inflation in 1970 coincided with the beginning of a rebound in unemployment and an economic recession. In 1973-75, this round of unemployment rebound and the economy being deemed a recession both occurred after the CPI inflation rate broke 8%. In early 1980, when the CPI inflation rate reached an extremely high level of over 14%, the unemployment rate rebounded significantly and the economy began to decline.<b>If inflation is still rising when a recession occurs, the U.S. economy will continue to decline. The US economy will only begin to recover after the inflation rate has fallen.</b>For example, in the late 1970s, the US economy did not begin to recover until inflation fell below 5%; In 1975, after the inflation rate peaked and fell for a quarter, the US GDP growth rate turned positive quarter-on-quarter and the unemployment rate began to decline.</p><p><b>The direct impact of inflation on the economy is mainly reflected in consumption.</b>Compared to policy interest rates, the negative correlation between the US inflation rate and private consumption growth is more pronounced. Especially in the 1980s, when policy interest rates jumped sharply, the inflation rate had already fallen ahead of schedule, and private consumption also began to rebound, indicating that easing inflation was of significant help to the recovery of consumption.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/157a3ac9e6b19301fad3ca7e2e88c069\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"419\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The second driver of the recession: high interest rates.</b>Overall, the Fed's rate hike had a significant cooling effect on the economy at the time:<b>When the US economy is overheating, rate hike has an immediate effect on cooling the economy:</b>For example, in mid-1973, the U.S. manufacturing PMI exceeded 60, and Federal Reserve rate hike quickly cooled the \"overheated\" economy.<b>While the US economy itself was in a downturn or even recession, rate hike deepened the magnitude of its economic contraction:</b>For example, after policy interest rates peaked in mid-1974, the US economy accelerated its decline, with US GDP shrinking sharply by 3.7% quarter-on-quarter in the third quarter. After the federal funds rate reached a peak of over 17% in March and April 1980, U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 8.0% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of the same year.<b>Conversely, interest rate cuts can help economic recovery:</b>In December 1970, when the policy interest rate fell below the inflation rate, the U.S. economy immediately began to recover. In early 1975, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and brought the policy rate nearly 5 percentage points below the inflation rate, and the U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1975.<b>However, cutting interest rates prematurely and immaturely when inflation is not effectively controlled could result in \"recurring inflation + higher rate hike,\" leading to a deeper recession or delaying a recovery that should have begun earlier.</b>In early 1974, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates, but as inflation continued to rise and the negative impact on the economy persisted, the U.S. economy still entered a recession. In May 1980, the monthly federal funds rate had fallen to around 11% (supplemented by credit controls), and the U.S. economy temporarily broke out of recession territory in August. However, as repeated inflation forced the Federal Reserve to choose more aggressive rate hike, the U.S. economy fell into a new and deeper recession in 1981.</p><p><b>The impact of interest rates on the economy is mainly reflected in investment.</b>Compared to inflation, the negative correlation between policy interest rates and private investment (lagging by one year) is more pronounced. In the latter half of 1980, the Federal Reserve briefly cut interest rates, and a year later, private investment in the United States rebounded significantly. In 1981, when the Federal Reserve resumed significant rate hike, the growth rate of private investment declined significantly a year later, but inflation had also fallen significantly during this period, indicating that private investment was more sensitive to interest rate trends.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d940f253f486815be3e542cd6e173587\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The third driver of the recession: supply shocks.</b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979 dragged down U.S. economic growth in many ways, thus triggering economic recessions.<b>First,</b>As mentioned above, supply shocks raised the CPI inflation rate, and rising consumer prices suppressed aggregate demand. In particular,<b>Supply shocks have triggered rising energy consumption costs and crowded out other consumption.</b>After 1974, the proportion of energy product and service consumption in private consumption in the United States rose from about 6% before the shock to 7-9%, before declining significantly after 1985.<b>Second, supply shocks increased the cost of US oil imports, causing GDP to \"evaporate\".</b>The first oil crisis caused oil prices to rise by about $10 per barrel, and in 1974, the United States' net oil imports were about 6 million barrels per day. We estimate that rising oil prices will drag down US GDP by approximately $21.9 billion by increasing net import costs, dragging down nominal GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points. Similarly, after the second oil crisis, rising net oil import costs dragged down the nominal GDP growth rate of the United States by 2.8 percentage points in 1979.<b>Third, supply shocks have triggered raw material shortages, weakening U.S. industrial production capacity.</b>Following two rounds of supply shocks in the 1970s, the overall U.S. industrial production index declined sharply year-on-year. Comparing the two shocks reveals that during the first shock, the US CPI inflation rate was lower while the PPI inflation rate was higher, resulting in a deeper impact on industrial production. This also reflects that the impact of supply shocks on economic output is more primarily manifested on the \"supply side\".</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bbaa840667be8378540c48fd32436e79\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3.2 What determines the degree of recession?</b></p><p><b>The four rounds of recession mentioned above can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82) according to the degree of GDP contraction and the duration of the recession.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>1970 \"soft landing\"</b>The background is that inflationary pressures are relatively limited. At that time, the highest CPI inflation rate was only 6.2%, and the Federal Reserve did not significantly rate hike, with the highest policy interest rate being only around 9%. The limited inflation was due to two reasons: firstly, it was not shocked by supply, and secondly, it was related to the Nixon administration's price controls.</p><p></li><li><b>\"Soft landing\" in 1980</b>The backdrop is that inflation has peaked and fallen, and the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates in a timely manner. At that time, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once reached a historical high of 14.8%, and the federal funds rate reached 17.6% per month. However, when the recession began and the Federal Reserve quickly cut interest rates and the policy rate dropped sharply to around 9%, the economy quickly began to recover.</p><p></li><li><b>1973-75 \"Hard Landing\"</b>The main reason is that, under supply shocks, the inflation rate continued to rise during the recession, and subsequently the policy interest rate had to rise rapidly in line with inflation (even if the policy interest rate was not significantly higher than the inflation rate).</p><p></li><li><b>\"Hard landing\" in 1981-82</b>The backdrop was that the Federal Reserve was eager to curb inflation and thus adopted very aggressive rate hike measures (Federal Funds rate once reached around 20%). Although the inflation rate quickly began to decline, the policy interest rate remained significantly higher than the inflation rate, slowing down the economic recovery process.</p><p></li></ul><b>Therefore, we can conclude that the requirements for a \"soft landing\" are quite stringent—firstly,</b>Inflationary pressures should not be too high, and the CPI inflation rate may need to fall in a timely manner in the early stages of the recession.<b>Secondly,</b>The Federal Reserve's rate hike should not be too aggressive, and it may even need to cut interest rates in a timely manner when a recession arrives.<b>Finally,</b>If the government intervenes excessively in prices, or if a new supply shock unfortunately occurs, then the \"soft landing\" may only be temporary, and inflation may rebound in the future, making a \"hard landing\" more difficult to avoid.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5c05ee90fc4945e31d8dc59cbb9f3a8c\" tg-width=\"1073\" tg-height=\"367\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>04. Clues to Asset Prices</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s and 1980s, high inflation was the \"biggest enemy\" of the U.S. economy and policies, so the inflation situation became a bellwether for the capital market. During this process, the market understands and digests the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become a key clue to asset prices. In addition, the \"Great Stagflation\" caused long-term pain to the economy and markets, resulting in safe-haven assets such as the US dollar performing positively for a considerable period of time.</b></p><p><b>4.1 US Stocks: Inflation is the Biggest Enemy</b></p><p><b>During this period, the US stock market was dominated by inflation, and whenever the inflation rate turned downward, the US stock market immediately rebounded.</b>July 1970, December 1974, and March 1980 corresponded to three peaks in the U.S. CPI inflation rate, and also marked the beginning of the S&P 500 rebound. This may indicate that during periods of high inflation, inflation trends are what the market is most concerned about: as long as inflation remains high, the Federal Reserve is likely to continue tightening, and the US economy will be threatened by both high inflation and high interest rates. As long as inflation declines, even if the economy is temporarily weak, and the market believes that falling prices are conducive to economic recovery and that the Federal Reserve's tightening is expected to ease, the stock market will include recovery expectations.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f3acab3e6f335ccd1d9e96b22ddd4750\" tg-width=\"1069\" tg-height=\"519\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>US stocks are in a bottom out in the middle of a recession, and the magnitude of the correction does not entirely depend on the severity of the recession.</b>In the early stages of the four rounds of recession defined by the NBER, US stocks were under pressure. However, before the recession ended, US stocks were often the first to rebound as monetary policy expectations eased, inflationary pressures began to ease, and market recovery expectations strengthened. In other words,<b>The \"policy bottom\" precedes the \"market bottom,\" and the \"market bottom\" precedes the \"economic bottom.\"</b>Data shows that the bottoms of the S&P 500 index all occurred during recessions.</p><p><b>However, the magnitude of the correction in US stocks does not entirely depend on the severity of the recession:</b>During the \"soft landings\" of 1970 and 1980, and the \"hard landings\" of 1981-82, the S&P 500 index fell by no more than 20%. Only during the \"hard landing\" of 1973-75 did the S&P 500 index fall by nearly 40%. In terms of the magnitude of the rebound, after four rounds of recession and a correction in US stocks, the rebound in US stocks has been relatively strong, with the S&P 500 index rebounding from its lows by more than 30% in both cases.</p><p><b>The logic behind this may lie in:</b>The market after the \"soft landing\" remains optimistic overall. Although the market after the \"hard landing\" is not as optimistic, the cost-effectiveness of US stocks can still attract capital inflows due to the low \"base\" before. This means that regardless of the severity of the recession, as long as you find the bottom and moderately \"lean forward\" to invest in US stocks, you may be able to obtain good returns.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/164eaafd25fa17da2d93917b48fdcdc5\" tg-width=\"1063\" tg-height=\"500\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The Federal Reserve is not the \"eternal enemy\" of US stocks.</b>Comparing the performance of US stocks after 1970 and 1980, even though the US CPI inflation rate was higher, the Federal Reserve's rate hike was more aggressive, and the recession was not weak after 1980, the overall performance of US stocks was significantly better than in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the S&P 500 index remained almost sideways amidst fluctuations, while after 1980, the S&P 500 index maintained a volatile upward trend. In particular, compared to 1973-75 and 1981-82, both were \"hard landings,\" but the latter saw a smaller decline and a larger rebound in US stocks. The biggest difference between the two periods is that<b>The latter, with the Federal Reserve tightening more strongly, may have played a more significant role in \"manufacturing\" the recession.</b>During the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hike, the inflation rate declined significantly: on the one hand, it alleviated the suppression of economic growth by high inflation, and on the other hand, the market had more confidence in the Federal Reserve, which in turn led to stronger recovery expectations and higher risk appetite. Furthermore, after 1980, \"Reaganism\" entered the historical stage, and after the market was fully and painfully cleared, American productivity increased rapidly. Therefore, the US stock market rebounded more strongly, driven by both the decline in policy interest rates after inflation was brought under control and the profit growth of listed companies. From this perspective, inflation is the \"biggest enemy\" of US stocks, while the Federal Reserve is not; The Federal Reserve, which has the ability to curb inflation, has ultimately become a \"friend\" of US stocks!</p><p><b>4.2 US Treasury Bonds: Dancing with Monetary Policy</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s, the US Treasury market experienced a prolonged bear market, with high inflation and high interest rates combined to drive up US Treasury yields.</b>However, the volatility of the 10-year US Treasury yields is significantly less than that of the CPI inflation rate and policy interest rate. It is worth mentioning that the correlation between the US economic recession and US Treasury yields is not obvious: around the four rounds of recession in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields declined in the first round, fluctuated upwards in the second round, rose sharply in the third round, and fluctuated upwards in the fourth round. This may reflect the evolution of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy logic, namely, the increasing emphasis on inflation and the weakening of its consideration of the economy. Then<b>Over time, the market trades less for \"recession\" and more for \"tightening.\"</b>It wasn't until after the third quarter of 1982, when the CPI inflation rate was below 5% and GDP contracted year-on-year, that the market believed the Federal Reserve could wholeheartedly cut interest rates, and US Treasury yields declined significantly.</p><p><b>In the 1980s, the trend of the 10-year US Treasury yields became more closely related to the trend of policy interest rates.</b>From 1980 to 1981, the US CPI inflation rate showed a downward trend, but the US Treasury yields rose rapidly over the next 10 years, mainly driven by the strong tightening of monetary policy. After 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields closely aligned with the trend of policy interest rate fluctuations, reflecting the effectiveness of monetary policy reforms during the Volcker era, namely, the Federal Reserve's driving force on bond interest rates increased significantly.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9d465d535d3e18340e29dfe32d95faea\" tg-width=\"1068\" tg-height=\"502\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Although the 10-year US Treasury yields and policy interest rates \"dance together,\" the fluctuations are smaller.</b>Before the 1970s, the absolute levels and trends of US Treasury yields and Federal Funds rate were very similar over the past 10 years. In the 1970s, when high inflation arrived and the Federal Reserve rate hike, the 10-year US Treasury yields would also rise, but the increase was smaller, and then \"underperformed\" the policy interest rate. The reasons are: on the one hand, the emergence of high inflation and high interest rates has reduced market risk appetite, and US Treasury bonds have played a certain safe-haven role; On the other hand, due to concerns about economic growth, the market doubts the sustainability of high interest rates, which in turn suppresses medium- and long-term US Treasury yields (the maturity premium of US Treasury bonds is negative). After inflation subsided and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, the 10-year US Treasury yields also fell, but the magnitude was still limited, causing US Treasury yields to \"outperform\" policy interest rates. The reason for this phenomenon may be the rise in inflation expectations. In fact, after 1983, the 10-year decline in US Treasury yields was insufficient, which once became a new problem facing the Federal Reserve: the US inflation rate had fallen to around 2%, but because market inflation expectations had not fallen in time, bond market interest rates fell slowly, hindering economic recovery. Later, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, began to regard bond market interest rates as a benchmark for inflation expectations and paid more attention to the management of inflation expectations. Only then did the 10-year US Treasury yields trend further align with policy interest rates.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/73d7be6ac6bef4e338dc445e6ab9169f\" tg-width=\"1065\" tg-height=\"503\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>4.3. US Dollar: Multiple factors contribute to a strong dollar</b></p><p><b>Factors such as the Federal Reserve's rate hike, rising market demand for safe-haven assets, and the impact on non-US economies collectively contributed to the strong dollar in 1981-84.</b>In the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused the US dollar to depreciate rapidly, and the US dollar exchange rate was not strongly correlated with the US economic and monetary cycle during this period. From 1981 to 1984, the US dollar exchange rate continued to strengthen, and the the US Dollar Index rose from around 85 in the second half of 1980 to a historical peak of 160. The strong dollar did not come to an end until Plaza Accord signed it in 1985.</p><p><b>How should we understand the strong dollar during this period?</b>First, after 1980, the Federal Reserve, led by Volcker, strictly controlled the money supply, leading to an increase in the scarcity of the dollar. Second, in 1981-82, the US economy fell into recession due to the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hike, and the US stock market experienced a significant correction. Economic and market risks stimulated the safe-haven attributes of the US dollar. Third, in 1983-84, the US economy bid farewell to high inflation and entered a strong recovery, while the Federal Reserve's policy interest rate and US Treasury yields remained relatively high. The US dollar exchange rate continued to strengthen during this period: on the one hand, market confidence in the Federal Reserve increased; On the other hand, the spillover effects of the Federal Reserve's previous tightening on non-US economies became apparent (such as the deep debt crisis in Latin America in 1982-85), which made dollar assets highly attractive.</p><p>It is worth mentioning that,<b>During the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hike, both the US Dollar Index and US Treasury yields showed an upward trend.</b>However,<b>The reaction of the US dollar exchange rate lagged that of US Treasury yields:</b>For example, in June 1980, the 10-year US Treasury yields had already begun to rise rapidly, while the rise in the US Dollar Index lagged behind by about 3 months. In June 1984, the 10-year US Treasury yields began to decline due to market expectations of interest rate cuts, but the decline in the US Dollar Index lagged by nine months.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/61242bb3f7016cf966b35fefe3930648\" tg-width=\"1067\" tg-height=\"452\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>05. New insights for the present</b></p><p><b>1. The causes of this round of US inflation share many similarities with those of the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited.</b></p><p>Similar to the 1970s, the current high inflation in the United States is also the result of a combination of factors, including monetary and fiscal easing, the Federal Reserve's slow action, and supply shocks. But in comparison,<b>We tend to think that US inflation will not run out of control as it did then:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This time, the US government did not implement harsh price controls like the Nixon administration did. The balancing effect of price signals on supply and demand did not disappear, reducing the risk of future inflation recurrences.</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>The current risk of a \"wage-price\" spiral in the United States is relatively lower, partly due to the still relatively stable medium- to long-term inflation expectations, and partly due to the long-term weakening of the power of US labor unions.</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>The United States is currently more capable of digesting the \"oil crisis,\" especially after the shale oil revolution in 2010. The proportion of energy consumption in total private consumption in the United States has decreased, and the United States has also transformed from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. As a result, the transmission of oil prices to the core inflation rate in the United States has decreased. Therefore, even though the current year-on-year growth rate of the energy sub-item of the US CPI is as high as 40%, reaching the level of the two oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the core CPI inflation rate is significantly lower than at that time.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e9d6130cfa6c71161fdc10b5eaa79c0\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"411\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2. Although the Federal Reserve has also made \"mistakes\" in this round, it has taken the initiative in combating inflation.</b></p><p>The \"capriciousness\" of monetary policy and the lack of market confidence in it were important backgrounds for the recurring stagflation in the 1970s and 1980s. In comparison,<b>The Federal Reserve now has more initiative, and even though it underestimated the sustainability of inflation in 2021 (the \"inflation temporary theory\"), this mistake may still have room to be reversed:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>In understanding and addressing \"stagflation,\" the Federal Reserve is no longer \"crossing the river by feeling the stones,\" and its monetary policy has long since clearly defined the goal of \"price stability.\" Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve has declared that \"price stability\" is a prerequisite for \"maximum employment\" and regards curbing inflation as the primary task of monetary policy.</p><p></li><li><b>Secondly,</b>Since the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve has had a stronger ability to monitor inflation expectations (such as the emergence of inflation-protected bonds after 2000), is more efficient in communicating with the market, and has established a relatively good reputation. Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve's tightening signals have significantly raised the nominal interest rate on US Treasury bonds, and the quick response of the capital market reflects the credibility of monetary policy. Current U.S. inflation expectations have not \"deanchored,\" with the ten-year inflation expectation monitored by the Cleveland Fed model not exceeding 2.5%, far below the 4-5% level in the 1980s.</p><p></li><li><b>Finally,</b>The Federal Reserve is now more independent. Currently, inflation is a common \"enemy\" faced by the Biden administration and the Federal Reserve, and the Fed's tightening is supported by the president. Even if economic pressures increase in the future and the president puts pressure on the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve is expected to be relatively firm in defending its credibility. Just as Powell's Federal Reserve held four rate hike in 2018, despite then-President Trump's criticism.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aeb68357b44663ea8caedbf43793c2db\" tg-width=\"1074\" tg-height=\"436\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3. The current US economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\".</b></p><p>In the 1970s and 1980s, when the US CPI inflation rate rose above 5%, the economic recession arrived as expected. Compared to the current situation:</p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This year, the US CPI inflation rate reached a peak of 9.1%, which not only exceeded the level that triggered the previous recession, but also surpassed the level during the US economic \"soft landing\" in 1970.</p><p></li><li><b>Second,</b>The Federal Reserve is currently showing great determination to curb inflation and may maintain policy interest rates at a \"sufficiently restrictive level\" for an extended period of time, even at the cost of an economic recession (see our previous report, \"The Fed's Credibility Defense\"). This means that, similar to the Volcker era of 1981-82, the Fed's tightening efforts this time may be enough to \"create\" a recession;</p><p></li><li><b>Third,</b>The risk of recurring inflation in the future cannot be ruled out at present. If a new supply shock unfortunately occurs in the future, or if the Federal Reserve's actual tightening efforts are insufficient (e.g., if the Federal Reserve stops tightening prematurely or even cuts interest rates when the US economy actually enters a recession, political pressure rises, or financial risks occur in the future), then US inflation may still fluctuate, leading to a larger recession.</p><p></li></ul><b>4. The price trends of major asset classes in this round may be quite similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s.</b></p><p><b>1) US stocks: Inflation remains the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the current inflation trend is also strongly correlated with the performance of US stocks.</b>In the first half of this year, as the US CPI inflation rate continued to rise, US stocks ushered in a deep correction; From mid-June to mid-August, commodity prices and inflation expectations cooled, leading to a temporary rebound in US stocks. Since late August, as high inflation has persisted beyond expectations and the Federal Reserve's policy stance has become more hawkish, US stocks have increased their focus on monetary policy, triggering a new round of \"tightening panic\".</p><p></li><li><b>The US stock market may remain under pressure for some time to come, similar to the period in 1981-82 when Volcker fought inflation and \"created\" a recession.</b>In 1981-82, although the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to decline, the Federal Reserve's tightening impacted the economy and stock market. Similarly, the Federal Reserve seems to want to return to the \"Volcker era\" and will inevitably ensure that inflation falls, even at the cost of a recession. Currently, US inflation remains high, the economy has not yet experienced a substantial recession, and the market has not fully priced in the recession. There may still be room for adjustment in US stocks in the future. Historically, US stocks may still fall in the early stages of an economic recession, and only after monetary policy begins to ease in the later stages of the recession do they experience a sustained rebound.</p><p></li><li><b>However, the Federal Reserve will not be the \"eternal enemy\" of US stocks. If the Fed successfully helps bring down inflation, the correction in US stocks may not be too deep.</b>When Volcker \"manufactured\" the recession in 1981-92, the correction in US stocks was relatively limited and did not fall below the bottom of early 1980. While the Federal Reserve's vigorous fight against inflation may bring short-term pain, it can prevent recurring long-term pain. Considering that the current inflation situation is more optimistic than in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Federal Reserve's actions are not too passive, the current correction in US stocks may not be too deep, and the rebound may be earlier than historical experience.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f004d3c8a3173e8965e08861dace942\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2) US Treasury bonds: Monetary policy remains the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when a recession materializes. It will have to wait until monetary policy clearly begins to ease.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the core influencing factor for US Treasury yields in the current decade is monetary policy.</b>The experience of the 1970s and 1980s was that the bond market oscillated between \"recession trading\" and \"tightening trading\". However, as the Federal Reserve becomes more determined in its fight against inflation, the bond market is trading less in \"recession\" and more in \"tightening\". In July of this year, the 10-year US Treasury yields fell significantly due to cooling inflation expectations and rising recession expectations. However, since late August, as the Federal Reserve's policy stance has become more hawkish, the market has become more focused on tightening. As a result, the 10-year US Treasury yields has continued to rebound in the past 10 years and has broken through 4%, exceeding the high of 3.5% in mid-June.</p><p></li><li><b>If the Federal Reserve continues to tighten during the recession, then US Treasury yields may not decline quickly in the early 10 years of the recession.</b>Just as in the early days of the US economic recession in 1981-82, even though the US CPI inflation rate had fallen significantly from its peak, it was still far from the 2% target. Monetary policy was not relaxed, and US Treasury yields remained at a high level for 10 years. We expect that even if the U.S. economy begins to recess in the first half of 2023, the Federal Reserve may choose to stick to tightening and not cut interest rates, and the bond market may not trade for a recession too early.</p><p></li><li><b>A decline in 10-year US Treasury yields may require a substantial drop in policy interest rates.</b>In the second half of 1982, when the US CPI inflation rate fell below 5% and the economic recession was deep, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates sharply, and the US Treasury bull market truly began. It should also be noted that the starting point of the policy interest rate decline at that time was earlier than the 10-year US Treasury yields, and the decline was also deeper. This means that US Treasury yields may only decline significantly in 10 years after monetary policy clearly begins to ease.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/18e234a92705cc42b9b876c30857ee92\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"410\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3) US Dollar: The \"strong dollar\" may last for a long time, and a decline in the US dollar exchange rate may require a pullback in US Treasury yields.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>In the medium term, the logic behind the current \"strong dollar\" is very similar to that of the 1980s.</b>In 1980-84, the US Dollar Index reached its \"historical peak,\" and even during this period, the US dollar exchange rate remained strong for a long time. Currently, the logic supporting the US dollar is very similar to that of the 1980s: the US economy has a clear advantage over non-US regions, and the Federal Reserve is more confident in tightening than other developed economies. Looking ahead, even if the US economy moves from \"stagflation\" to \"recession,\" financial risks to non-US economies may not be eliminated (as can be seen from the fluctuations in European and Japanese bond and currency markets this year). On the contrary, market trust in US dollar assets will increase (for example, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have already weakened). Therefore, for at least the next 1-2 years, the fluctuation center of the the US Dollar Index is expected to remain higher than the pre-COVID-19 level.</p><p></li><li><b>In the short term, US Treasury yields may be a \"leading indicator\" for judging the trend of the US dollar.</b>In 1980, US Treasury yields began its upward cycle 10 years earlier than the US Dollar Index; From 1984 to 1985, US Treasury yields declined 10 years earlier than the US Dollar Index. In fact, past market performance has largely confirmed US Treasury yields' leading position over the US Dollar Index:<b>the US Dollar Index usually also peaks and falls 1-3 months after the 10-year US Treasury yields peaks and falls.</b>As mentioned earlier, the start of this round of US Treasury bull market may need to wait until the recession materializes and monetary policy eases, after which signs of the US Dollar Index peaking and falling may become increasingly clear.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa0454ffd0dbe555b8d8d2e59c3c5c0d\" tg-width=\"1075\" tg-height=\"408\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b><i>Risk Warning:</i></b></p><p><b><i>1. The resilience of the US economy has fallen short of expectations.</i></b><i>Although there is still room for recovery in the US service sector, in an environment of high inflation and high interest rates, insufficient consumer confidence may suppress actual consumption, resulting in weaker economic growth than the benchmark expectation. With the Federal Reserve's rate hike and demand cooling, the pace of cooling in the US job market may exceed expectations.</i></p><p><b><i>2. New supply shocks occur.</i></b><i>If new supply shocks occur in the future and raise international prices of commodities such as energy and food again, the pressure of \"stagflation\" in the United States may increase significantly, and the Federal Reserve may have to \"create\" a recession to curb inflation, turning market sentiment pessimistic.</i></p><p><b><i>3. The Federal Reserve's tightening efforts are insufficient or too strong.</i></b><i>If the Federal Reserve's insufficient tightening causes inflation to fluctuate, the Fed's subsequent cost of controlling inflation will be greater. If the Federal Reserve's tightening efforts are significantly stronger than market expectations, the risk of market volatility may increase and could ultimately threaten the real economy.</i></p><p><b><i>4. Economic and financial risks in non-US regions exceeded expectations, etc.</i></b><i>Currently, economic and financial risks in large economies such as Europe and Asia are showing signs of rising. If a major economic and financial risk event occurs in the future, the US economy and market may be affected.</i></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49ae9add1640b1e283a53b027b0227c7\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"868\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc83db9c8a7fe6fe220fca7ca329cf0d\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"513\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/580ee36c20670ad5f1a888d715380e06\" tg-width=\"999\" tg-height=\"928\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p></body></html></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/4f6ec6e99c0c8b9feb7f296b78c65a54","relate_stocks":{".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index"},"source_url":"","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1100486117","content_text":"一、高通胀的复杂性。1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击引发了成本推动型通胀；最后，长期超调的通胀率破坏了通胀预期的稳定，引发工资-物价螺旋，加深了通胀的顽固性。二、美联储的“过”与“功”。1970-1979年，美联储紧缩不够坚决，原因是多方面的：首先，美联储一度认为通胀是“非货币现象”；其次，当时美联储的首要目标是“充分就业”而非“物价稳定”；最后，美联储决策还受到政治因素影响。1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀视为己任，坚定加息和控制货币供给。此后，美联储在较长时间里致力于稳定通胀预期，重塑了美联储的信誉。三、“软着陆”与“硬着陆”。1970-80年代美国共出现4轮经济衰退，可分为两次“软着陆”（1970年和1980年）和两次“硬着陆”（1973-75年和1981-82年），这是高通胀、高利率和供给冲击共同作用的结果。但实现“软着陆”的条件是较为苛刻的：首先，CPI通胀率或需在衰退初期及时回落；其次，美联储加息不能过于激进，甚至需要在衰退到来时及时降息；最后，若发生新的供给冲击，“硬着陆”可能更难避免。四、资产价格的线索。1970-80年代，通胀成为资本市场的风向标。美国CPI通胀率三次阶段性触顶，美股皆阶段性触底。但在此过程中，市场对通胀形势以及货币政策逻辑都有一个理解与消化的过程。随时间推移，美债市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。在1980年以后的“沃尔克时代”，货币政策开始成为资产价格的关键线索。“大滞胀”结束后，美元等避险资产仍在较长时间里表现积极。五、对当下的新启示。第一，本轮美国通胀成因与1970-80年代有诸多相似性，但整体压力更为有限；第二，本轮美联储虽然也曾“犯错”，但在抗击通胀方面更占据主动；第三，本轮美国经济衰退几成必然，且存在“硬着陆”风险；第四，本轮大类资产价格走势与1970-80年代或有较强相似性：1）美股：通胀仍是核心影响因素，未来仍有调整压力，但调整幅度或不会太深，反弹或待衰退兑现。2）美债：货币政策仍是核心影响因素，衰退兑现时也未必立即回落，需等到货币政策明确开始放松。3）美元：“强势美元”可能持续较久，美元回落或需美债利率回落。风险提示：美国经济弱于预期，出现新的供给冲击，非美金融风险上升等。2022年以来，美国CPI通胀率一度升破9%，实际GDP连续两个季度环比萎缩，经济的（类）滞胀特征更加鲜明，资本市场也经历了大幅波动。8月下旬杰克逊霍尔会议以来，美联储在各类场合不断提到“历史经验”，说明当前美国经济环境与1970-80年代极为相似，而美联储也将充分借鉴当时的应对经验，有所为而有所不为，以期帮助美国战胜“滞胀”。当前美国通胀压力几何？货币政策会如何应对？美国经济是否还能实现“软着陆”？资本市场何时迎来“春天”？在本篇报告中，我们带着对当下的疑问，重温1970-80年代美国“大滞胀”时期的通胀、货币政策、经济增长和资产价格表现，并尝试理解其中的逻辑与规律，以期对判断未来一段时间美国经济、货币政策和市场走向有所启发。01、高通胀的复杂性1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击引发了成本推动型通胀；最后，长期超调的通胀率破坏了通胀预期的稳定，引发工资-物价螺旋，加深了通胀的顽固性。1969-1982年，美国陷入高通胀危机，CPI通胀率普遍高于5%，最高曾达到14.8%。美国CPI同比增速自1968年开始便以3%以上的速度较快上升，1969年3月CPI同比破5%，从此开始了长达13年的“高通胀”时代。在1969-1982年里，美国CPI同比增速走势出现三轮波峰，峰值分别在1970年1月（6.2%）、1974年12月（12.3%）和1980年3月（14.8%）。1982年2月CPI同比回落至5%以下。1965-70年，财政和货币盲目扩张，孕育通胀走高。随着二战后经济重建告一段落，加上欧洲与亚洲经济的兴起，美国经济增长动能趋弱，但政策层面盲目刺激，导致经济明显过热。1965-1970年，美国实际GDP增速持续高于潜在增速水平，且产出缺口（实际GDP与潜在GDP差值）占潜在GDP的比重高达3-6%。换言之，当时美国经济增速中有3-6个百分点都是政策刺激出来的。这一时期，美国自然失业率在5.6-5.9%，但实际失业率基本保持在4%以内。在当时，财政刺激的角色强于货币。美国联邦财政支出占GDP比重由在1966-68年期间上升了3.2个百分点，赤字率由1965年的0.2%扩大至1968年的2.8%。1968年，美国政府开始担心财政平衡问题，时任总统约翰逊6月签署了“1968收支控制法”，通过加税补充财政收入。而美联储于同年8月“技术性降息”以对冲加税的影响，为经济过热添火助力。1971-74年，粗暴的价格管制将“短痛”变为“长痛”。1971年8月，尼克松政府实行了为时90天的工资和物价冻结。但实际上，随后价格管制的范围不断扩大，直至1974年美国政府才完全取消对物价的干预。这期间，除特殊情况外，所有商品和服务涨价都需要经过政府审批。1972年中，美国CPI通胀率回落至3%以下。这一次价格管制，被视为美国经济史上和平时期政府全面干预价格的一个特例，也被认为是一次失败的尝试。这是因为，限价措施在抑制物价上涨的同时，也严重打击了生产企业的积极性，造成社会商品供应不足，为后来通胀的恶化埋下伏笔。1974年尼克松因“水门事件”下台，新总统卡特上台，价格管制措施逐步失效。略显滑稽的是，尼克松和卡特政府均尝试通过口头“劝诫”来管控物价。例如，卡特刚上台时曾鼓励民众买“便宜货”：“要敢于向他人炫耀，自己专挑便宜货买，并为此感到自豪”。这些劝诫对于管控物价几乎是徒劳的，美国CPI通胀率自1973年4月重新破5%，此后一路上行并于1974年12月达到12.3%的阶段高点。1973年和1979年的一次粮食危机和两次石油危机，展示了供给冲击对美国物价的破坏力。1973年，前苏联谷物受恶劣天气影响而歉收，继而进入国际市场大量购买粮食，引发了二战以来最为严重的粮食危机。1973年末，美国食品CPI同比增速一度升破20%。1973年10月至1974年3月，第一次石油危机爆发：以沙特为首的石油输出国组织成员国宣布，对赎罪日战争期间支持以色列的国家实施石油禁运，美国首当其冲。世界银行原油均价由1973年9月的2.7美元/桶，跃升至1974年初的13美元/桶，涨幅接近500%。1974年3-9月，美国能源CPI同比增速均超过30%。1979年初至1980年初，第二次石油危机爆发：伊朗爆发伊斯兰革命，而后伊朗和伊拉克爆发“两伊战争”，导致全球石油产量锐减。世界银行国际油价由1978年12月的不到15美元/桶升，至1979年11月的40美元/桶以上。1980年3月，美国能源CPI同比达到47.1%的峰值，美国CPI同比也随即达到14.8%的顶点。1970-80年，美国标题通胀率持续超调后，通胀预期失控，在工会力量助推下，“工资-物价螺旋”逐渐形成。在CPI通胀率连续多年高于2%、甚至高于5%后，美国居民对物价失去原有的信心，通胀预期上升。当时，无论是美联储还是市场，对于通胀预期的认知和跟踪都比较有限。当下广泛引用的密歇根大学调查和克利夫兰联储模型预期，在1980年前后才陆续诞生。美国最早的通胀预期监测工具是1946年诞生的利文斯顿调查（The Livingston Survey），它总结了来自企业、政府、银行业和学术界的通胀预测。该调查显示，1970年以后美国通胀预期逐渐走高，尤其两次石油危机后，通胀预期也随标题通胀率陡然上升。通胀预期对于物价的反向影响主要通过工资传导：劳工要求涨薪，继而居民的消费能力与企业的成本压力上升，同时促成物价上涨，即形成“工资-物价螺旋”。尤其是，1970年代美国工会力量庞大，工资诉求的传导较为通畅：据美国劳工统计局（BLS）数据，当时美国工会成员占社会总雇员的近三成，每年发生千人以上罢工运动高达200-400起（2000年以后这一数字已常年低于30起）。1976年中至1978年中，美国CPI通胀率回落至5-7%左右，但美国非农非管理人员平均时薪同比增速达到6-8%、持续高于CPI通胀率。工资上涨的粘性阻碍了通胀的进一步回落，并为后来通胀的反弹做铺垫。1970-79年，美联储的政策应对较为消极，持续“落后于曲线”，未能有效遏制通胀。1980年以前，美国政策利率与通胀走势呈现较强同步性，体现了美联储在较长的时间里都在“落后于曲线”、“追赶曲线”。1969年5月，在通胀率破5%后的第三个月，美国政策利率才开始明显上升并超过通胀率3个百分点以上，此后通胀率保持上升了半年左右才开始回落。1973年下半年，美国通胀率仍在上升的情况下，美联储迫于经济压力而降息，继而通胀率加速上升。1978年，美国政策利率与通胀率基本持平，并保持亦步亦趋地上升，直到1978年12月，联邦基金月率升破10%并高出通胀率1个百分点，但很快政策利率又开始落后于通胀率。后来，当美国政策利率显著高于即期通胀率后，通胀才明显回落，美联储在遏制通胀方面才算拥有了主动：1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储大幅升息抗击通胀；1981年中，美国政策利率到达19%以上的高峰，同年10月CPI环比和同比同时下降；此后联邦基金利率持续高于CPI通胀率4-9个百分点不等，通胀率持续回落。02、美联储的“ 过” 与“ 功”1970-1979年，美联储紧缩不够坚决，原因既包括对通胀与货币政策的关系认知不足，也包括货币政策的独立性缺失。1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀视为己任，坚定加息和控制货币供给。此后，美联储在较长时间里致力于稳定通胀预期，重塑了美联储的信誉。2.1、美联储犹豫的原因1970-1979年，美联储持续“落后于曲线”，原因是多方面的。首先，美联储一度认为通胀是“非货币现象”。当时，美联储对于高通胀的成因出现分歧，并倾向于认为通胀主要由非货币因素造成，继而货币政策选择消极应对。例如，1970年，伯恩斯领导的美联储认为，工会力量引发了成本推动型通胀，继而主张动用“收入政策”调控，而不愿收紧货币供给。这也推动了尼克松政府后来实施的工资和物价冻结。1974年，伯恩斯又认为，“不恰当的财政纪律”是导致通胀的主因。其次，美联储在当时的首要目标是“充分就业”而非“物价稳定”。1970年代以前，凯恩斯主义理念主导货币政策逻辑，美联储专注于总需求管理，并坚信菲利普斯曲线（失业率与通胀的负相关性）的存在。因此，美联储将货币政策的首要目标落脚在实现“充分就业”，希望维持较低且稳定的失业率水平，继而当失业率上升时，货币政策的天平更向就业市场倾斜。当“滞”与“胀”同时发生时，美联储一度认为通胀不会继续恶化。例如，1978-79年米勒领导的美联储认为，只要失业率在充分就业水平之上（5.5%以上），货币宽松就不会加深通胀。最后，美联储决策还受到政治因素影响。1970-1978年担任主席的伯恩斯、以及1978-79年任职的米勒，均受到时任总统的影响而缺乏独立性，在平衡通胀与经济增长的关系时摇摆不定。事后来看，1970年代美联储对通胀的容忍可能正是执政者所希望看到的：一方面，执政者不希望美联储因遏制通胀而破坏经济增长、影响选票；另一方面，较高的通胀也被视为一种隐性的税收手段，因名义工资上涨提高了整个税收体系的累进程度，使财政收入大幅上升。数据显示，美国个人所得税占GDP比重在1969-70年、1974年以及1979-83年的高通胀时期，均有明显上升。2.2、沃尔克时代的功绩1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀为己任，坚定地加息和控制货币供给，虽然“制造”了经济衰退，但也最终战胜了通胀。1979 年8月，沃尔克就任美联储主席，其采取了以弗里德曼为代表的“货币学派”观点，其领导的美联储更加明确了货币政策对于物价稳定的核心地位，并将货币供给（M1）增速纳入货币政策目标，继而大幅加息，使联邦基金利率高于CPI通胀率，以达到控制货币供给的目标。1980年3月，沃尔克曾实施了一次不甚明智但短暂的信贷控制试验（“特别信贷限制计划”），以期减缓加息幅度，但随后又重启货币政策紧缩，并最终在1981年中将联邦基金利率一度推升至20%以上的峰值。大幅加息虽然带来了经济衰退，但最终帮助通胀回落。此外，在沃尔克和格林斯潘时代，美联储建立了新的“名义锚”，以稳定通胀预期并重塑美联储的信誉，这也是日后美国物价回归长期稳定的重要背景。1980年代，在经历“大滞胀”后，原本的物价稳定预期遭遇严重损害。即便在沃尔克时代，美联储明确了货币供给目标、坚定地提高了利率，但货币政策的可信度仍受质疑。公众并不清楚美联储能否长期保持对通胀的重视，并有能力影响中长期物价走势。因此，沃尔克和其下任联储主席格林斯潘，更致力于重构稳定的通胀预期，使其成为货币政策的“名义锚”，最终重新树立货币政策的可信度。这是一个复杂而漫长的过程：沃尔克战胜通胀的经历是良好起点，而后美联储由货币供给目标转向“隐性通胀目标制”。实际操作中，美联储同时盯住“增长缺口”和“通胀预期缺口”，事实上通过泰勒规则制定政策利率，追求稳定的中长期通胀目标，实现稳定的经济增长。在通胀预期管理上，美联储通过债券收益率变动来监测通胀预期，同时加强与资本市场的沟通，增强了货币政策的可信度与市场预期的稳定性。沃尔克时代后的货币政策框架，在物价稳定方面取得了长期性成果，造就了后来的大稳健时代（Great Moderation，1984-2007年）。03、“ 软着陆” 与“ 硬着陆”1970-80年代美国共出现4轮经济衰退，这是高通胀、高利率和供给冲击共同作用的结果。高通胀对于消费产生直接的抑制作用，并驱使美联储加息、进一步抑制投资。因此，衰退的程度取决于通胀的严峻性以及货币政策的应对，实现“软着陆”的条件是较为苛刻的。3.1、经济衰退的三大推手按照美国国民经济研究局（NBER）的划分，1970-80年代美国经济共出现四轮衰退：第一轮是1970年1月至11月（11个月）。美国实际GDP同比由1969年的3.2%下滑至1970年的0.2%，但经济几乎没有萎缩。而美国失业率却显著攀升，由1969年12月的3.5%升至1970年12月的6.1%（阶段高点），在此后的24个月里均保持在5%以上。第二轮是1973年12月至1975年3月（16个月）。美国实际GDP同比由1973年的5.6%断崖式下滑，曾连续5个季度同比萎缩，季度同比萎缩最深达2.3%。美国失业率连续31个月高于7%，由1973年10月阶段低点的4.6%，一路走高至1975年5月的9.0%，此后缓慢下降。第三轮是1980年2月至7月（6个月）。美国实际GDP环比折年率于1980年二季度大幅萎缩8%，不过同比仅萎缩0.8%。在这一时期，美国失业率由6.3%最高升至7.8%。1980年下半年，美国经济立即开始复苏，四季度GDP环比大幅上涨7.7%，失业率于8月开始回落。第四轮是1981年8月至1982年11月（16个月）。美国实际GDP曾连续4个季度同比萎缩、最深萎缩2.6%。美国失业率在1981年8月开始从7.2%的阶段低点显著回升，同年11月破8%，1982年11月达到10.8%的峰值，此后缓慢回落，1984年2月才降至8%以下。衰退推手之一：高通胀。比较当时的经济与通胀走势，二者呈现出十分紧密的相关性：美国经济衰退发生的节点，均对应CPI通胀率上升或触顶的时候。例如，1970年CPI通胀率触顶时点，恰好是失业率反弹与经济衰退的开端；1973-75年，这一轮失业率反弹和经济被认定为衰退的时点，都在CPI通胀率破8%以后；1980年初，当CPI通胀率触及14%以上的极高水平时，失业率显著反弹、经济开始衰退。如果衰退发生时，通胀率仍在上升，则美国经济继续下行；只有通胀率回落后，美国经济才开始复苏。例如，1970年末，直到通胀回落至5%以下，美国经济才开始复苏；1975年，当通胀率触顶回落一个季度后，美国GDP环比增速转正、失业率开始下降。通胀对经济的直接影响主要体现在消费上。相比政策利率，美国通胀率与私人消费增速的负相关性更为明显。尤其在1980年代，当政策利率大幅跃升时，通胀率已经提早回落，当时私人消费也开始回升，说明通胀缓和对于消费回暖有明显帮助。衰退推手之二：高利率。整体而言，当时美联储加息对经济的降温效应是明显的：当美国经济处于过热时，加息对经济的降温效果可谓立竿见影：如1973年中，美国制造业PMI超过60，美联储加息使“过热”的经济快速降温。当美国经济本身处于下行甚至衰退时，加息则深化了经济萎缩的幅度：如1974年中，政策利率达峰后，美国经济下行速度加快，三季度美国GDP环比大幅萎缩3.7%；1980年3-4月，联邦基金月率达到17%以上的阶段高点后，同年二季度美国GDP环比大幅萎缩8.0%。反之，降息可助力经济复苏：1970年12月，当政策利率降至通胀率之下时，美国经济立刻处于复苏状态；1975年初，美联储降息并使政策利率低于通胀率近5个百分点，美国经济于1975年二季度开始复苏。但是，在通胀未得到有效控制时过早地、不成熟地降息，可能会以“通胀反复+更高幅度的加息”收场，从而酿至更大程度的衰退，或延缓本应更早开始的复苏：1974年初，美联储选择降息，但由于通胀继续走高、对经济的负面影响持续，美国经济仍步入衰退；1980年5月，联邦基金月率已降至11%左右（辅以信贷管制），8月美国经济暂时脱离衰退区间，但由于此后通胀反复迫使美联储选择更大力度地加息，1981年美国经济陷入新一轮程度更深的衰退。利率对经济的影响主要体现在投资上。相比通胀，政策利率与私人投资（滞后1年）的负相关性更为明显。1980年下半年，美联储短暂降息，一年后美国私人投资明显反弹；1981年，当美联储重新大幅加息后，一年后的私人投资增速明显下滑，但该时期通胀也已明显回落，说明私人投资对利率走势更为敏感。衰退推手之三：供给冲击。1973年和1979年的粮食和石油危机，对美国经济增长造成了多方面拖累，因此都引发了经济衰退。第一，如上文提到，供给冲击抬升了CPI通胀率，消费价格上涨抑制了总需求。尤其是，供给冲击引发能源消费成本上升，并挤占了其他消费。1974年以后，美国能源产品和服务消费占私人消费比重，由冲击前的6%左右上升至7-9%，直到1985年以后才明显回落。第二，供给冲击增大了美国石油进口成本，导致GDP“蒸发”。第一次石油危机导致油价上涨约10美元/桶，1974年美国石油净进口量约为600万桶/日。我们测算，石油涨价通过增加净进口成本对美国GDP的拖累约为219亿美元，拖累GDP名义增速1.4个百分点；类似地，第二次石油危机后，石油净进口成本上升拖累了1979年美国GDP名义增速2.8个百分点。第三，供给冲击引发原材料紧缺，削弱了美国工业生产能力。1970年代的两轮供给冲击后，美国工业生产总指数同比均出现大幅下降。对比两次冲击可以发现，第一次冲击时，美国CPI通胀率较低、而PPI通胀率更高，继而工业生产所受冲击程度更深，这也体现了供给冲击对经济产出的影响更主要地表现在“供给端”。3.2、衰退程度取决于什么对于上述4轮衰退，按照GDP萎缩程度、以及衰退时长划分，可分为两次“软着陆”（1970年和1980年）和两次“硬着陆”（1973-75年和1981-82年）。1970年“软着陆”的背景是，通胀压力相对有限。当时CPI通胀率最高仅为6.2%，继而美联储也未大幅加息，政策利率最高仅为9%左右。而通胀有限，一方面是没有遭受供给冲击，另一方面也和尼克松政府的价格管制有关。1980年“软着陆”的背景是，通胀见顶回落、美联储及时降息。当时美国CPI通胀率一度达到14.8%的历史高点，联邦基金月率曾经达到17.6%，但当衰退开始时，美联储迅速降息，政策利率大幅下降至9%左右时，经济很快开始复苏。1973-75年“硬着陆”的主要原因是，供给冲击下，衰退期间通胀率仍在上行，继而政策利率也不得不跟随通胀快速上升（即使政策利率并未显著高于通胀率）；1981-82年“硬着陆”的背景是，美联储迫切希望遏制通胀，从而采取十分激进的加息措施（联邦基金利率曾达到20%左右），虽然通胀率很快开始下降，但政策利率仍持续、显著高于通胀率，使经济复苏进程延缓。由此，我们可以得出结论：“软着陆”的要求是较为苛刻的——首先，通胀压力不能太大，CPI通胀率或需要在衰退初期及时回落。其次，美联储加息不能过于激进，甚至需要在衰退到来时及时降息。最后，如果政府对价格进行过度干预，或者不幸发生了新的供给冲击，那么“软着陆”可能只是暂时的，日后通胀可能反弹、“硬着陆”更难避免。04、资产价格的线索1970-80年代，高通胀是美国经济和政策的“最大敌人”，因而通胀形势也成为资本市场的风向标。在此过程中，市场对通胀形势以及货币政策逻辑都有一个理解与消化的过程。在1980年以后的“沃尔克时代”，货币政策开始成为资产价格的关键线索。此外，“大滞胀”为经济和市场带来了长期伤痛，继而美元等避险资产在较长时间里表现积极。4.1、美股：通胀是最大的敌人这一时期美股走势由通胀主导，每当通胀率调头向下，美股便立即反弹。1970年7月、1974年12月和1980年3月，对应着美国CPI通胀率的三轮顶点，同时也是标普500指数反弹的开端。这或说明，在高通胀时期，通胀走势是市场最为关注的：只要通胀居高不下，美联储就有继续紧缩的可能，美国经济便受到高通胀和高利率的共同威胁；而只要通胀回落，即便经济暂时疲弱，市场相信回落的物价有利于经济复苏、且美联储紧缩有望放松，股市便计入复苏预期。美股在衰退中期触底反弹，调整幅度不完全取决于衰退程度。在NBER定义的4轮衰退初期，美股均承压，但衰退尚未结束时，由于货币政策预期趋松、通胀压力开始缓和，市场复苏预期增强，美股往往率先迎来反弹。换言之，“政策底”领先于“市场底”，“市场底”又领先于“经济底”。从数据上看，标普500指数的底部均出现在衰退时期内。不过，美股调整幅度并不完全取决于衰退程度：1970年和1980年的“软着陆”中，以及1981-82年的“硬着陆”中，标普500指数跌幅均不超过20%；只有1973-75年的“硬着陆”中，标普500指数跌幅接近40%。从反弹幅度看，四轮衰退和美股调整后，美股反弹都是较为强劲的，标普500指数由低谷反弹的幅度均超30%。其背后的逻辑或许在于：“软着陆”后的市场整体保持乐观，“硬着陆”后的市场虽然没有那么乐观，但由于此前“基数”较低，美股的性价比仍能吸引资金流入。这意味着，无论衰退程度如何，只要找准底部适度“前倾”布局美股，均有可能获得不错的收益。美联储不是美股“永远的敌人”。对比1970年后和1980年后的美股表现，即便1980年后美国CPI通胀率更高、美联储加息更为激进、衰退程度也不弱，但美股的整体表现显著好于1970年代。1970年代，标普500指数在波动中几乎保持横盘，而1980年以后标普500指数维持震荡上行趋势。尤其对比1973-75年和1981-82年，都是“硬着陆”，但后者美股下跌幅度更小、反弹幅度更大。两段时期最大的区别在于，后者美联储紧缩力度更强，在“制造”衰退中可能发挥了更重要的作用。在美联储激进加息过程中，通胀率显著下降：一方面缓解了高通胀对经济增长的抑制，另一方面市场对于美联储更有信心，继而令复苏预期更强、风险偏好更高。此外，1980年后，“里根经济学”登上历史舞台，在市场充分而痛苦地出清后，美国生产率快速提升。因而，美股受到通胀可控后的政策利率下降、以及上市公司盈利增长的“双轮驱动”，反弹更为强劲。从这个角度来看，通胀才是美股“最大的敌人”，而美联储不是；有能力遏制通胀的美联储，反而最终成为了美股的“朋友”！4.2、美债：与货币政策“共舞”1970年代，美债市场经历了一段长期熊市，高通胀和高利率共同驱动美债利率上行。但是，10年美债利率的波幅明显小于CPI通胀率和政策利率的波幅。值得一提的是，美国经济衰退与美债利率的相关性并不明显：在1970年、1974-75年、1980年和1982年的四轮衰退前后，10年美债利率在第一轮有所回落，第二轮震荡上行，第三轮大幅走高，第四轮震荡偏强。这或体现了美联储货币政策逻辑的演进过程，即对通胀的重视不断提高、对经济的兼顾不断弱化。继而随时间推移，市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。直到1982年三季度以后，当CPI通胀率低于5%、GDP同比萎缩时，市场相信美联储能够心无旁骛地降息，美债利率才明显走低。1980年代，10年美债利率走势与政策利率走势更加紧密。1980-81年，美国CPI通胀率呈下行走势，但10年美债利率快速上行，主要由货币政策强力紧缩驱动。1982年以后，10年美债利率与政策利率波动趋势比较贴合，这体现了沃尔克时代货币政策改革的成效，即美联储对债券利率的驱动力显著提升。虽然10年美债利率与政策利率“共舞”，但波动幅度更小。1970年代以前，10年美债利率与联邦基金利率的绝对水平和走势都很相近。1970年代，当高通胀到来、美联储加息时，10年美债利率虽然也会上升，但上升幅度更小，继而“跑输”政策利率。原因在于：一方面，高通胀和高利率的出现，降低了市场风险偏好，美债发挥了一定避险属性；另一方面，市场出于对经济增长的担忧，怀疑高利率的可持续性，继而压低了中长端美债利率（美债期限溢价为负）。当通胀回落、美联储降息后，10年美债利率虽也回落，但幅度仍然有限，使美债利率“跑赢”政策利率，这一现象的原因或许在通胀预期的上升。事实上，1983年以后，10年美债利率下降幅度不足，一度成为美联储面临的新问题：美国通胀率已回落至2%附近，但由于市场通胀预期仍未及时回落，债券市场利率下降缓慢，阻碍了经济复苏。后来，沃尔克领导的美联储开始将债券市场利率视为通胀预期的标尺，更加重视对通胀预期的管理，10年美债利率走势才进一步贴合政策利率。4.3、美元：多因素造就强美元美联储加息、市场避险需求上升、非美经济受冲击等因素，共同造就了1981-84年的强势美元。1970年代，布雷顿森林体系崩溃造成美元汇率迅速贬值，这一时期的美元汇率与美国经济和货币周期相关性不强。1981-84年，美元汇率持续走强，美元指数由1980年下半年的85左右，一度升破160的历史峰值；直到1985年《广场协议》签署，强势美元才得以终结。如何理解这一时期的强势美元？首先，1980年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储严格控制货币供给，美元的稀缺性上升；第二，1981-82年，美国经济因美联储激进加息而陷入衰退，美股经历明显调整，经济和市场风险激发了美元的避险属性；第三，1983-84年，美国经济告别了高通胀，步入强劲复苏，美联储政策利率和美债利率仍维持着相对高位。这一时期美元汇率仍在走强：一方面，市场对美联储的信心提升；另一方面，前期美联储紧缩对非美经济的外溢效应显现（如1982-85年拉美深陷债务危机），这使美元资产具备十足的吸引力。值得一提的是，在美联储激进加息时期，美元指数和美债利率均呈上行趋势。不过，美元汇率的反应滞后于美债利率：例如1980年6月，10年美债利率已经开始快速上行，而美元指数的上行滞后了3个月左右；1984年6月，10年美债利率受市场降息预期影响而开始回落，但美元指数的回落滞后了9个月。05、对当下的新启示1、本轮美国通胀成因与1970-80年代有诸多相似性，但整体压力更为有限。类似1970年代，当前美国的高通胀同样是货币和财政宽松、美联储行动迟缓、供给冲击等多重因素交织的结果。但对比来看，我们倾向于认为美国通胀不会像当时那般失控：第一，这一次美国政府并未像当年尼克松政府那样实施粗暴的价格管制，价格信号对供需的平衡作用并未消失，降低了日后通胀反复的风险；第二，当前美国“工资-物价”螺旋风险相对更低，一方面得益于目前仍较稳定的中长期通胀预期，另一方面得益于美国工会力量的长期削弱；第三，当前美国消化“石油危机”的能力更强，尤其2010年页岩油革命后，美国能源消费占私人消费总额的比重已下降，美国也从原油的净进口国转变为净出口国，因此油价对美国核心通胀率的传导下降。因此，即便当前美国CPI能源分项同比增速高达40%、达到1970-80年代两次石油危机的程度，但核心CPI通胀率明显低于当时。2、本轮美联储虽然也曾“犯错”，但在抗击通胀方面更占据主动。货币政策的“反复无常”，以及市场对货币政策缺乏信心，是1970-80年代滞胀反复的重要背景。对比来看，美联储如今掌握更多主动，即便在2021年低估了通胀的可持续性（“通胀暂时论”），但这一错误或仍有挽回的余地：首先，在认识和应对“滞胀”上，如今美联储已不再“摸着石头过河”，货币政策早已明确“物价稳定”的目标。今年以来，美联储宣称“物价稳定”是“最大就业”的前提，将遏制通胀视为货币政策的首要任务。其次，沃尔克-格林斯潘时代后，美联储监控通胀预期的能力更强（如2000年以后通胀保值债券诞生），与市场沟通的效率更高，建立了较为良好的信誉。今年以来，美联储紧缩信号显著抬升了美债名义利率，资本市场的敏捷反应折射出货币政策的可信性。当下美国通胀预期并未“脱锚”，克利夫兰联储模型监测的十年通胀预期不超过2.5%，远不及1980年代4-5%的水平。最后，如今美联储的独立性更强。当前，通胀是拜登政府和美联储共同面对的“敌人”，美联储紧缩受到总统的支持。即便未来经济压力加大、总统向美联储施压，预计美联储也会较为坚定地捍卫信誉。正如鲍威尔领导的美联储曾在2018年四次加息，不顾时任总统特朗普的批评一样。3、本轮美国经济衰退几成必然，且存在“硬着陆”风险。1970-80年代，当美国CPI通胀率升高至5%以上时，经济衰退便如期而至。对比当前：第一，今年美国CPI通胀率最高达到9.1%，不仅超过了此前触发衰退的水平，且已超过1970年美国经济“软着陆”时期水平；第二，当前美联储表现出很大决心遏制通胀，或将政策利率维持在“足够限制性水平（sufficiently restrictive level）”较长时间，不惜付出经济衰退的代价（参考我们此前报告《美联储信誉保卫战》）。这意味着，类似1981-82年沃尔克时期，本次美联储紧缩力度可能足以“制造”一场衰退；第三，目前尚不能排除未来通胀反复的风险。如果未来不幸发生了新的供给冲击，或者美联储实际紧缩力度不足（如未来当美国经济切实进入衰退、政治压力上升、或发生金融风险时，美联储过早停止紧缩甚至降息），那么美国通胀仍可能反复，从而酿至更大程度的衰退。4、本轮大类资产价格走势与1970-80年代或有较强相似性。1）美股：通胀仍是核心影响因素，未来仍有调整压力，但调整幅度或不会太深，反弹或待衰退兑现。类似1970-80年代，当前通胀走势与美股表现也有较强相关性。今年上半年，随着美国CPI通胀率不断上升，美股迎来一轮深度调整；6月中旬至8月中旬，大宗商品价格与通胀预期降温，美股阶段性反弹；8月下旬以来，随着高通胀的持续性超出预期，美联储政策取向更加强硬，美股对货币政策的关注加强，上演了新一轮“紧缩恐慌”。未来一段时间美股市场或仍将承压，类似1981-82年沃尔克抗击通胀并“制造”衰退的时期。1981-82年，虽然美国CPI通胀率持续回落，但美联储紧缩对经济和股市造成冲击。类似地，当前美联储似乎想要重回“沃尔克时代”，势必确保通胀回落，不惜付出衰退代价。目前，美国通胀仍处高位、经济尚未实质性衰退，市场对衰退的计价尚不充分，后续美股或仍有调整空间。从历史经验看，美股在经济衰退初期仍可能下跌，直到衰退中后期货币政策开始放松，美股才迎来持续性反弹。不过，美联储不会是美股“永远的敌人”，若美联储顺利帮助通胀回落，美股调整幅度或不会太深。1981-92年沃尔克“制造”衰退时，美股调整幅度相对有限，并未跌破1980年初的底部。美联储大力抗击通胀虽带来“短痛”，但可避免通胀反复的“长痛”。考虑到，本轮通胀形势比1970-80年代还更乐观一些，美联储行动也不算太过被动，这一轮美股调整幅度或不会太深、反弹也可能较历史经验更提前一些。2）美债：货币政策仍是核心影响因素，衰退兑现时也未必立即回落，需等到货币政策明确开始放松时。类似1970-80年代，当前10年美债利率的核心影响因素也是货币政策。1970-80年代的经验是，债券市场在“衰退交易”和“紧缩交易”之间徘徊。但随着美联储抗击通胀更加坚决，债券市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。今年7月，因通胀预期降温、衰退预期升温，10年美债利率明显回落。但8月下旬以来，随着美联储政策取向更加强硬，市场更加关注紧缩，因而近期10年美债利率持续反弹并已升破4%，超过6月中旬3.5%的阶段高点。如果美联储在衰退时也坚持紧缩，那么衰退初期10年美债利率未必很快回落。正如在1981-82年美国经济衰退初期，即便美国CPI通胀率已由高点明显回落，但与2%的目标仍有很大距离，货币政策并未放松，10年美债利率保持在高位。我们预计，即便2023年上半年美国经济开始衰退，但美联储可能选择坚持紧缩、不会降息，债市可能也不会过早交易衰退。10年美债利率下降或需政策利率实质性下降。1982年下半年，美国CPI通胀率回落至5%以下、经济衰退程度较深时，美联储开始大幅降息，美债牛市才真正开启。且注意到，当时政策利率下降的起点领先于10年美债利率、下降幅度也更深。这意味着，待货币政策明确开始放松后，10年美债利率或才能明显下降。3）美元：“强势美元”可能持续较久，美元汇率回落或需美债利率回落中周期看，当前“强势美元”的逻辑与1980年代十分相似。1980-84年，美元指数走出了“历史大顶”，即便期间美联储降息，美元汇率也长期保持强势。当前，支撑美元的逻辑与1980年代十分相似：美国经济相对非美地区有明显优势，美联储紧缩底气强于其他发达经济体。往后看，即便美国经济由“滞胀”走向“衰退”，非美经济金融风险也未必消除（这从今年欧洲、日本债券和汇率市场波动中便可窥见一斑），反而市场对美元资产的信任会增强（如当前比特币等加密货币已然走弱）。因此，至少在未来1-2年，美元指数波动中枢有望持续高于新冠疫情前水平。短周期看，美债利率或是判断美元走势的“领先性指标”。1980年，10年美债利率早于美元指数开启上行周期；1984-85年，10年美债利率先于美元指数回落。事实上，过往的市场表现也基本印证了美债利率对美元指数的领先性：在10年美债利率触顶回落后的1-3个月，美元指数通常也见顶回落。如前所述，本轮美债牛市的开启或需等到衰退兑现且货币政策趋松，在此之后美元指数触顶回落迹象或才能日渐清晰。风险提示：1、美国经济韧性不及预期。虽然美国服务业复苏仍有空间，但高通胀和高利率环境下，居民消费信心不足或压制实际消费，继而使经济增长状况弱于基准预期；随着美联储加息和需求降温，美国就业市场降温节奏或超预期。2、发生新的供给冲击。如果未来新的供给冲击发生，并再度抬升国际能源、食品等商品价格，美国“滞胀”压力或将显著抬升，美联储可能不得不“制造”衰退才能遏制通胀，市场情绪将转为悲观。3、美联储紧缩力度不足或过强。如果美联储紧缩力度不足造成通胀反复，美联储后续治理通胀的成本更大；如果美联储紧缩力度明显强于市场预期，市场波动风险或将上升并可能最终威胁实体经济。4、非美地区经济金融风险超预期等。当前欧洲、亚洲等大型经济体的经济金融风险出现上升迹象。如果未来发生大型经济金融风险事件，美国经济和市场或受到波及。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".IXIC":0.9,".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1505,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":668629318,"gmtCreate":1664673789438,"gmtModify":1676537491579,"author":{"id":"4110531690656330","authorId":"4110531690656330","name":"Walden.","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9305a33ceded43e6a928eb1b0b7616d","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4110531690656330","idStr":"4110531690656330"},"themes":[],"title":"","htmlText":".","listText":".","text":".","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/668629318","repostId":"1153575084","repostType":2,"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1055,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":668099880,"gmtCreate":1664283926741,"gmtModify":1676537424911,"author":{"id":"4110531690656330","authorId":"4110531690656330","name":"Walden.","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9305a33ceded43e6a928eb1b0b7616d","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4110531690656330","idStr":"4110531690656330"},"themes":[],"title":"","htmlText":"6","listText":"6","text":"6","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/668099880","repostId":"661483449","repostType":1,"repost":{"id":661483449,"gmtCreate":1664184790755,"gmtModify":1676537405312,"author":{"id":"3527667568191018","authorId":"3527667568191018","name":"胖虎福利","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/733bbf790057cc91c5e0b1aa5569977c","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3527667568191018","idStr":"3527667568191018"},"themes":[],"title":"一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜？特斯拉2022 AI Day即將揭曉答案","htmlText":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","listText":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","text":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","images":[{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9327ca5b98a1761a3de3864f295c901","width":"-1","height":"-1"},{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/058669d709b4bda6ca11888f1fe825bf","width":"-1","height":"-1"},{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/67256fa209e44b7ae28ffda3f04db43a","width":"-1","height":"-1"}],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":2,"paper":2,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/661483449","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":0,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":4,"langContent":"CN","totalScore":0},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":991,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"lives":[]}