To The Moon

Kagan, a senior fellow at Brookings and longtime advocate of American internationalism, argues that the post-1945 U.S.-led liberal international order—characterized by alliances (NATO, U.S. security guarantees in Asia), open trade, norms against territorial conquest, and American provision of global public goods like secure sea lanes—is ending. Crucially, this is not due to American decline or overstretch in material terms, but because the U.S. (under Trump’s second term) no longer chooses to sustain it.

Core Arguments in Kagan's Essay

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (as described) officially embraces multipolarity, spheres of influence, and transactional power politics. U.S. power shifts from underwriting global stability (a “grand bargain” where allies accepted U.S. dominance in exchange for security and prosperity) to openly pursuing narrow national advantage: tariffs on allies, demands for payment for protection (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Europe), threats against NATO partners (e.g., Canada, Denmark over Greenland), and a focus on Western Hemisphere primacy while suggesting accommodation with Russia and China in their regions.

This returns the world to a pre-1945 multipolar system: frequent great-power rivalry, overlapping spheres of influence as sources of conflict (e.g., historical examples like Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War, Balkan crises leading to WWI), weaker alliances, and security as a transactional good rather than a public good. States must rearm independently (Europe potentially nuclearizing with Germany/Poland/France pursuing deterrence against both Russia and the U.S.; Japan and South Korea building autonomous capabilities amid U.S. unreliability) or cut deals/submit to stronger powers. Small states lose sovereignty protections.

Greenland serves as a potent symbol: Trump’s threats (or renewed interest) in acquiring/seizing it from Denmark (a NATO ally) treat territory as a strategic asset (Arctic resources, military positioning) rather than respecting post-WWII norms of sovereignty and self-determination. This undermines alliance trust and illustrates the shift from rules-based order to raw power politics.

Kagan’s closing warning echoes your summary directly: “If Americans thought defending the liberal world order was too expensive, wait until they start paying for what comes next.” Without allies sharing burdens, the U.S. faces contested access to markets/bases/resources, higher military spending, more flashpoints, and risks of major wars in a brutal multipolar environment—more dangerous than the Cold War or post-Cold War peace.

Historical Context and Kagan's Perspective

Kagan contrasts the post-1945 Pax Americana (low great-power war, prosperity for allies, containment of adversaries) with 19th/early 20th-century multipolarity’s frequent conflicts. He portrays the U.S. as uniquely positioned (geography, power projection, trusted by allies who relinquished regional ambitions) to sustain this order. The generations after WWII were the “true realists” for rejecting multipolarity’s illusions. Kagan sees Trump’s approach as deliberately dismantling this for short-term “America First” gains, leaving the U.S. isolated, less prosperous, and the world less secure.

Counterarguments and Realist Perspectives

Kagan’s view aligns with neoconservative/internationalist thinking (he has long warned of “the jungle grows back” without U.S. hegemony). Realist critics (e.g., John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, or “restraint” advocates) counter that:

• The liberal order was unsustainable and self-undermining: Endless wars (Iraq, Afghanistan costing trillions), NATO/EU expansion provoking Russia, trade policies enabling China’s rise, and allies’ chronic under-spending on defense (free-riding) eroded U.S. relative power and domestic support. Multipolarity/revisionism by Russia/China was a predictable reaction to U.S. primacy, not solely Trump’s doing.

• Transactional burden-sharing and focusing on core interests (e.g., great-power competition in Asia over peripheral commitments) could preserve U.S. strength long-term rather than bleed it maintaining an overextended order. Historical multipolarity had periods of stability (Concert of Europe); today’s nuclear weapons deter major war better than in 1914.

• Greenland interest (floated by Trump since 2019) reflects legitimate strategic concerns (Arctic melting, resources, Chinese/Russian activity) rather than pure aggression; sovereignty norms have always bent to power (e.g., historical annexations).

• Domestic costs of the old order (industrial hollowing, immigration/security spillovers from instability, elite disconnect) made continuation politically untenable. Retrenchment may raise short-term risks but avoid bankruptcy or imperial overreach.

Empirical points: U.S. defense spending as % of GDP and global share has declined relatively; allies’ NATO 2% target compliance lagged for years; China’s military/economic growth occurred within the open order. Polls and elections (2016, 2024) showed declining appetite for indefinite global policing.

Kagan is correct that abandoning the old system risks instability, alliance erosion, and higher defense burdens if competition intensifies (e.g., Europe/Asia rearmament arms races, contested sea lanes). Whether the alternative costs “much more” depends on whether the liberal order’s maintenance was viable or accelerating decline. The debate hinges on realism vs. liberalism: Can great powers cooperate in multipolarity without a hegemon, or does power politics inevitably produce more conflict?

This is a live, high-stakes shift in 2026. Outcomes will depend on execution, adversary responses, and whether allies truly rearm/coalesce independently or fragment.

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