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alvin88gan
2022-01-29

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Is Lu Zhengyao, the "wind-making master," betting on ready-made food to exploit franchisees this time?

如今陆正耀等相关方被彻底清理出瑞幸，不甘寂寞的商界老炮又重出江湖折腾新创业。

Is Lu Zhengyao, the "wind-making master," betting on ready-made food to exploit franchisees this time?

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{"i18n":{"language":"en_US"},"data":{"magic":2,"id":9099743379,"tweetId":"9099743379","gmtCreate":1643433780948,"gmtModify":1676533821033,"author":{"id":4089808990709360,"idStr":"4089808990709360","authorId":4089808990709360,"authorIdStr":"4089808990709360","name":"alvin88gan","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/47de138508ab4c7490371131185fa02a","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"wearingBadges":[],"fanSize":21,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"title":"","extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>999</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>999</body></html>","text":"999","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9099743379","repostId":1127592873,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1127592873","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1643427153,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/1127592873?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2022-01-29 11:32","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"Is Lu Zhengyao, the \"wind-making master,\" betting on ready-made food to exploit franchisees this time?","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1127592873","media":"豹变","summary":"如今陆正耀等相关方被彻底清理出瑞幸，不甘寂寞的商界老炮又重出江湖折腾新创业。","content":"<html><head></head><body>Changing its previous strategy of heavy asset investment and burning money to gain scale, Lu Zhengyao's China Bite Workshop has adopted a franchise model, using ready-made food as a spear to turn franchisees into \"investors.\" Can it create another Luckin Coffee? Which wave of retail investors is Lu Zhengyao trying to exploit this time?Author | Pan JieIf Lu Zhengyao follows his plan, shortly after the Lunar New Year of the Tiger, a brand new face will appear on the streets of cities such as Beijing and Shanghai – China Bite Workshop, which focuses on ready-made food. The speed of opening stores and the marketing impact will be just like when Luckin Coffee rose to prominence.Luckin Coffee opened its first store in China in October 2017, and by December 25, 2018, it had 2,000 stores. Luckin Coffee's speed brought Lu Zhengyao and the Shenzhou Group a moment of glory, but Luckin Coffee, which went public quickly, was soon exposed for 2.2 billion yuan in financial fraud. How glamorous it was before, it became disheveled after that.Now that Lu Zhengyao and other related parties have been completely eliminated from Luckin Coffee, the business veteran, not content with being alone, has returned to the scene to venture into new businesses.In August 2021, Lu Zhengyao's Qu Xiaomian opened, with plans to open 500 stores nationwide. From the outside perspective, this project, which has Luckin Coffee's own genes, did not cause much of a stir. Three months later, the company experienced a name change controversy, difficulty in securing financing, and a significant delay in store expansion.Subsequently, Lu Zhengyao, who turned his attention to another trend, ready-made food, changed his usual strategy of heavy asset investment and burning money to gain scale, and adopted a franchise model. Can China Bite Workshop support Lu Zhengyao's new ambitions?Is Lu Zhengyao also interested in franchisees?Lu Zhengyao is adept at finding the lifeline of wealth in trends.In the first half of 2021, capital was keen on \"eating noodles,\" and Lu Zhengyao's China Bite Technology launched Quxiaomian. Unfortunately, the performance was not good, so after quickly adjusting its direction, it identified a new trend - ready-made food.ready-made food is a pre-made semi-finished product. Manufacturers process the vegetables in advance and sell them by freezing or vacuum packaging. In the past, ready-made food focused more on B-end businesses in the catering industry. Now, with the rise in young people's enthusiasm for \"going to the kitchen\", ready-made food has set its sights on ordinary C-end consumers. The ingredients are all prepared and can be served with just a simple stir-fry, catering to the needs of young consumers.The C-end market has huge potential, and Lu Zhengyao's China Bite Workshop has set its sights on the C-end track.On January 21, Li Yingbo, rotating CEO of ChingeBite Technology, said in an interview with Caixin and other media that ChingeBite Technology has recently opened 10 offline directly operated stores and signed more than 3,000 franchisees. It plans to start expanding through a franchise model from the end of February.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bd0e4748419303cafd1f4a92d3e509bc\" tg-width=\"550\" tg-height=\"412\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/>A directly operated store of China Bite Workshop in Beijing / Leopard ChangeThe expansion speed of franchised stores is naturally much faster than that of direct operation, which is probably due to the experience and lessons learned from previous projects such as Luckin Coffee and Quxiaomian.Luckin Coffee's initial expansion speed of directly operated stores has amazed the industry, reaching 3,000 stores in 21 months. However, directly operated stores involve numerous costs such as rent, renovation costs, equipment, labor, and marketing, requiring brand owners to bear enormous financial pressure.According to Luckin Coffee's prospectus disclosed when it went public, sales and marketing expenses, store rent and labor were the two largest expenses in 2018, reaching RMB 750 million and RMB 580 million respectively. These two items accounted for 53.6% of the total cost, while the total revenue that year was only RMB 840 million. High costs have led to tight cash flow, forcing Luckin Coffee to constantly raise funds.The franchise model distributes various risks and costs to franchisees, reducing the risks of China Bite Workshop itself. For brands, it is an asset-light model. In the past, from Shenzhou Group to Luckin Coffee, and even Qu Xiaomian, Lu Zhengyao focused on the path of heavy asset development, and now he has no choice but to open franchise stores.A representative from Beijing China Bite Workshop's franchise recruitment agency told Leopard Change that there are currently three directly operated stores in Beijing, and 360-370 franchise stores have been signed in various districts of Beijing. Only Dongcheng, Xicheng, Shunyi, and Fangshan are eligible to sign franchise contracts, while other areas have already been taken over by franchisees.China Bite Workshop offers five franchise store types, with the smallest area being 8 square meters and an investment starting from 30,000 yuan. To join a China Bite Workshop franchise, you need \"a brand usage fee of 30,000 yuan, a deposit of 30,000 yuan, an annual operating fee of 20,000 yuan, and a design fee of 1,800 yuan,\" and \"a deposit of 30,000 yuan will be directly reduced or waived if you pay it before January 31st.\"If we simply calculate based on the current 10,000 yuan deposit for franchisees, 3,000 franchisees have allowed Lu Zhengyao to accumulate more than 30 million yuan in a short period of time. Compared to the pressure of tight cash flow under the previous direct-operation model, the franchise model makes money much faster, and the more stores you sign, the bigger the wealth snowball becomes.In addition to single-store franchising, regional franchising is a new way for China Bite Workshop to expand its market share.The so-called regional franchise is when both parties agree on how many stores to open in a region within a year, which is equivalent to franchising a region as a package. \"We have already leased 80 stores in Chaoyang District,\" the person in charge revealed. There are no restrictions on the types of stores in the leased area, and the 80 stores can also be stalls.According to the investment promotion materials of China Bite Workshop, the project's gross profit margin is 50%. To ensure franchisees' gross profit margins, the brand's supply price is 50% of the product's list price, and franchisees can ultimately set the price according to their own needs.However, this approach can easily lead franchisees into price wars. Although there are minimum price settings, price adjustments become a sensitive competition among franchisees, and franchisees with a large number of stores in the package area have an advantage. China Bite Workshop's investment promotion staff promised that to prevent malicious competition, a 500-meter radius of the store would be set as a protective distance.China Bite Workshop, which pioneered the franchise model, has also replicated to some extent the high subsidy strategy that Lu Zhengyao was good at before, not charging franchisees a profit share, but instead rewarding franchisees for recruiting people. On the one hand, they are trying to stimulate store expansion. For example, if a franchisee in a super first-tier city introduces a new partner or opens a store themselves, they can receive a bonus of 25,000 yuan per store. On the other hand, rewards ranging from 7 to 15 yuan will be given for attracting new qualified consumers in the early stages.It sounds like the franchise threshold is not high, and the subsidies are generous. Behind this is a continuation of Lu Zhengyao's past approach: rapid scaling up and then finding a profit point. However, for price-sensitive consumers, low prices are the key to success, and retaining users has always been a challenge after subsidies subsided.Of course, based on past experience, Lu Zhengyao could also choose to go public after growing in scale, buying time and space in the capital market.In recent years, franchising has been widely used in projects such as catering, milk tea, and education, which has been accompanied by doubts about \"harvesting retail investors,\" and even the emergence of fraudulent franchising schemes and contract fraud. Many brands rapidly expanded their influence through franchise models in the early stages, but subsequently failed to keep up in supply chain control, quality assurance, price competition, and personnel management, causing operational difficulties for franchisees and intensifying conflicts between franchisees and brands amid the wave of store closures.For Lu Zhengyao, who has no franchise management experience, the real test has not yet begun.Is ready-made food a good track?With the development of the \"lazy stay-at-home economy,\" ready-made food is gradually moving from B-end to C-end, becoming a hot trend. Celebrating the Lunar New Year locally has spurred a surge in the ready-made food market.Why did Lu Zhengyao's team also take a liking to ready-made food?In a media interview, Li Yingbo stated that cooking has a wider audience and more rigid demand than coffee. The normalization of the pandemic is changing people's dining habits, and the advancement of cold chain preservation technology has brought ready-made food into a more mature stage.The opening of several directly operated stores of China Bite Workshop before the Spring Festival was a test of the product and model.China Bite Workshop relies on offline stores for sales, and users can also choose to pick up their orders online or have them delivered to their homes. In mid-January, \"Leopard Change\" observed at the offline directly operated store of Beijing ChingBite Workshop (Jinyu Lijingyuan Store) that five freezers were set up on site. Staff said that the current delivery distance of ChingBite Workshop is three kilometers, and other orders can be picked up offline by consumers.As a long-time user of Luckin Coffee, I am no stranger to the China Bite Workshop model. By selecting products and placing orders on the APP and having them delivered through takeout, Luckin Coffee broke Starbucks' dominance over consumers with its low prices and delivery. Despite the fraud scandal and team reshuffle, Luckin Coffee has been able to maintain its foothold in the coffee chain industry. This is related to its product strength, with its new product \"Coconut Latte\" becoming popular in 2021 and even triggering another consumer boom for Luckin Coffee.For China Bite Workshop, in addition to low prices, the emergence of a blockbuster product is key to building brand influence. China Bite Workshop currently has 100 SKUs, and store staff say that Kung Pao Chicken is selling well.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1e9f8592191954b25180cd8883d5fd2\" tg-width=\"550\" tg-height=\"412\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/>ready-made food/Leopard Transformation inside China Bite WorkshopCultivating highly recognized blockbuster products among consumers is crucial for how China Bite Workshop can break through among a host of ready-made food players.Even before the establishment of China Bite Workshop, competition in the ready-made food market was already fierce. Upstream meat and aquatic product companies, midstream frozen food and instant food companies, and downstream fresh food e-commerce platforms and branded catering companies all began to make arrangements, and many players were also targeting C-end users. In April 2021, Weizhixiang, the first stock in ready-made food, was listed, which boosted optimism in the secondary market and further stimulated enthusiasm for ready-made food in the primary market.Compared to other brands, China Bite Workshop was established relatively late. These competitors already have strong consumer awareness and a fixed consumer base. Zhenwei Xiaomeiyuan and Maizima, which focus on ready-made food, have average order values between 20 and 40 yuan, and have received capital support. Ruxi Bei, a catering player, has launched the \"Jia Guolong Kung Fu Cuisine\" ready-made food brand. Hema, Dingdong Maicai, Missfresh, Yonghui, and others have all extended the possibilities of ready-made food consumption in their respective fields.These fresh food retail e-commerce players, in particular, have strong supply chain systems, abundant SKUs, and well-established delivery capabilities, which will directly compete with China Bite Workshop. In 2021, Missfresh had more than 800 ready-made food SKUs on its platform; Dingdong Maicai also stated that in 2021, sales of all ready-made food products on the platform increased by 300% compared to 2020.It is currently unclear what China Bite Workshop's competitive advantages are and how much market share it can carve out among so many players.Behind the rapid gathering of franchisees, China Bite Workshop is also trying to break this deadlock. Only when the franchise store is large enough can it negotiate with suppliers, enrich its SKUs, gain more bargaining power, profit from the price difference in the supply chain, and reduce costs in various aspects such as delivery.In addition to using subsidies and support to attract franchisees, China Bite Workshop is trying to capture the vision of its target customer group through younger channels. Li Yingbo once said that it will do a lot of campaigning on Douyin, Xiaohongshu and Bilibili to direct public domain traffic to the China Bite Workshop App and then distribute it to offline franchise stores.The aggressive marketing strategy is the same as Luckin Coffee's back then, but the direct operation and franchise models are different. The final effect of spending money on marketing may not be the same. After all, it is easier for brands to control and manage directly operated stores to ensure subsequent consumption and repeat purchases, while there is more uncertainty in the management of franchise stores. Once service flaws or quality problems occur, it will lead to a backlash for the brand.Twists and turns, new stories are hard to tell.Lu Zhengyao's return to the business world has been fraught with twists and turns, with his entrepreneurial project changing direction twice in four months. The shift from the asset-heavy approach that teams were good at in the past to the asset-light model of franchising is both a proactive and a passive and helpless move.In early August 2021, \"Qu Xiaomian\" officially opened as Lu Zhengyao's last battle before retirement. From the outside perspective, this project carries the \"Luckin Coffee gene\". According to the plan at the time, the second batch of Qu Xiaomian stores was to reach 500.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0599d3d0eeb00e674090d985206cf263\" tg-width=\"550\" tg-height=\"331\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/>However, a month after opening, Tech Planet quoted an employee of ChingBite Technology as saying that the company was basically operating at a loss. In early September, the expansion plan for the second batch of cities was suspended.As can be seen from previous comments from Qu Xiaomian stores, many consumers felt that the price of a serving of noodles was 20-30 yuan, and a set meal cost 40-50 yuan, which was not cost-effective. If it weren't for the promotion and discount, Qu Xiaomian would not be very attractive in the competition among a number of noodle brands.At the end of October, Qu Xiaomian began adding a new dish, Bayu Hot Pot Burger, hinting at a route adjustment. In November, the store's name was changed to Qubayu, and the menu expanded from its previous main focus on noodles. According to Dianping, there are currently three Qubayu stores operating in Beijing, all with ratings below 4. The first Qu Xiaomian store in Beijing, located in Phoenix Plaza Shopping Center, was also reported to have closed in early January 2022.The recruitment situation reflects that Lu Zhengyao's team has been recruiting relevant personnel from ready-made food since November 2021. At that time, the plan to enter the ready-made food market should have already been implemented, and the Spring Festival was a crucial time to experience the pre-cooked food market through directly operated stores.In Lu Zhengyao's business expansion, burning money to gain scale has always been key. From CAR Inc. and UCAR Inc. to Luckin Coffee, companies initially invested heavily in assets, burning money to subsidize users, and then aimed to profit through scaling up.When CAR Inc. was aggressively expanding its marketing efforts by attracting new users with \"zero rental on the first day,\" Lu Zhengyao once said that there is usually a critical point for economies of scale, and once this point is reached, it will definitely be profitable. For the Quxiaomian project, Lu Zhengyao's strategy is to \"open 500 stores nationwide\" and \"build it into a food court, and eventually form an online App\".But as soon as the story began, the pause button was quickly pressed. This is due to the impact of the pandemic on offline businesses, as well as difficulties in resolving financing issues.Heavy asset investment and cash-burning subsidies meant that a lot of capital support was needed in the early stages. After experiencing the fraud scandal, Lu Zhengyao's reputation in the capital market was not as good as before. In April 2020, Luckin Coffee was exposed for financial fraud amounting to 2.2 billion yuan, triggering a crisis of trust in Chinese concept stocks and extending the crisis of trust in Lu Zhengyao to the domestic investment circle.Public information disclosed that ChingeBite Technology completed a RMB 550 million Series A financing round in August 2021, led by PCCW Capital. A month after the Quxiaomian project was launched, news of financing was revealed. In the first half of 2021, the noodle business was highly favored by capital, with major noodle shops raising funds, from new ramen brands Ma Jiyong, Zhang Lala, and Chen Xianggui to Yujian Xiaomian, Zuimian, and Hefu Laomian. However, Qu Xiaomian, valued at 1 billion yuan, sought 100 million yuan in financing, but ultimately nothing came of it.By jumping into the ready-made food boom and choosing to build the China Bite Workshop brand through franchising, the initial capital threshold is not high. As long as you can gather a group of franchisees, it is equivalent to gathering a group of \"investors\" for the brand.However, these \"investors\" are also the operators of various franchise stores. At present, it seems that China Bite Workshop can get off to a quick start through the franchisee model, but the difficulty of further cultivation is increasing exponentially. For Lu Zhengyao, the real test is yet to come.</body></html>","source":"lsy1596797737369","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Is Lu Zhengyao, the \"wind-making master,\" betting on ready-made food to exploit franchisees this time?</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nIs Lu Zhengyao, the \"wind-making master,\" betting on ready-made food to exploit franchisees this time?\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\n豹变2022-01-29 11:32\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<html><head></head><body>Changing its previous strategy of heavy asset investment and burning money to gain scale, Lu Zhengyao's China Bite Workshop has adopted a franchise model, using ready-made food as a spear to turn franchisees into \"investors.\" Can it create another Luckin Coffee? Which wave of retail investors is Lu Zhengyao trying to exploit this time?Author | Pan JieIf Lu Zhengyao follows his plan, shortly after the Lunar New Year of the Tiger, a brand new face will appear on the streets of cities such as Beijing and Shanghai – China Bite Workshop, which focuses on ready-made food. The speed of opening stores and the marketing impact will be just like when Luckin Coffee rose to prominence.Luckin Coffee opened its first store in China in October 2017, and by December 25, 2018, it had 2,000 stores. Luckin Coffee's speed brought Lu Zhengyao and the Shenzhou Group a moment of glory, but Luckin Coffee, which went public quickly, was soon exposed for 2.2 billion yuan in financial fraud. How glamorous it was before, it became disheveled after that.Now that Lu Zhengyao and other related parties have been completely eliminated from Luckin Coffee, the business veteran, not content with being alone, has returned to the scene to venture into new businesses.In August 2021, Lu Zhengyao's Qu Xiaomian opened, with plans to open 500 stores nationwide. From the outside perspective, this project, which has Luckin Coffee's own genes, did not cause much of a stir. Three months later, the company experienced a name change controversy, difficulty in securing financing, and a significant delay in store expansion.Subsequently, Lu Zhengyao, who turned his attention to another trend, ready-made food, changed his usual strategy of heavy asset investment and burning money to gain scale, and adopted a franchise model. Can China Bite Workshop support Lu Zhengyao's new ambitions?Is Lu Zhengyao also interested in franchisees?Lu Zhengyao is adept at finding the lifeline of wealth in trends.In the first half of 2021, capital was keen on \"eating noodles,\" and Lu Zhengyao's China Bite Technology launched Quxiaomian. Unfortunately, the performance was not good, so after quickly adjusting its direction, it identified a new trend - ready-made food.ready-made food is a pre-made semi-finished product. Manufacturers process the vegetables in advance and sell them by freezing or vacuum packaging. In the past, ready-made food focused more on B-end businesses in the catering industry. Now, with the rise in young people's enthusiasm for \"going to the kitchen\", ready-made food has set its sights on ordinary C-end consumers. The ingredients are all prepared and can be served with just a simple stir-fry, catering to the needs of young consumers.The C-end market has huge potential, and Lu Zhengyao's China Bite Workshop has set its sights on the C-end track.On January 21, Li Yingbo, rotating CEO of ChingeBite Technology, said in an interview with Caixin and other media that ChingeBite Technology has recently opened 10 offline directly operated stores and signed more than 3,000 franchisees. It plans to start expanding through a franchise model from the end of February.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bd0e4748419303cafd1f4a92d3e509bc\" tg-width=\"550\" tg-height=\"412\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/>A directly operated store of China Bite Workshop in Beijing / Leopard ChangeThe expansion speed of franchised stores is naturally much faster than that of direct operation, which is probably due to the experience and lessons learned from previous projects such as Luckin Coffee and Quxiaomian.Luckin Coffee's initial expansion speed of directly operated stores has amazed the industry, reaching 3,000 stores in 21 months. However, directly operated stores involve numerous costs such as rent, renovation costs, equipment, labor, and marketing, requiring brand owners to bear enormous financial pressure.According to Luckin Coffee's prospectus disclosed when it went public, sales and marketing expenses, store rent and labor were the two largest expenses in 2018, reaching RMB 750 million and RMB 580 million respectively. These two items accounted for 53.6% of the total cost, while the total revenue that year was only RMB 840 million. High costs have led to tight cash flow, forcing Luckin Coffee to constantly raise funds.The franchise model distributes various risks and costs to franchisees, reducing the risks of China Bite Workshop itself. For brands, it is an asset-light model. In the past, from Shenzhou Group to Luckin Coffee, and even Qu Xiaomian, Lu Zhengyao focused on the path of heavy asset development, and now he has no choice but to open franchise stores.A representative from Beijing China Bite Workshop's franchise recruitment agency told Leopard Change that there are currently three directly operated stores in Beijing, and 360-370 franchise stores have been signed in various districts of Beijing. Only Dongcheng, Xicheng, Shunyi, and Fangshan are eligible to sign franchise contracts, while other areas have already been taken over by franchisees.China Bite Workshop offers five franchise store types, with the smallest area being 8 square meters and an investment starting from 30,000 yuan. To join a China Bite Workshop franchise, you need \"a brand usage fee of 30,000 yuan, a deposit of 30,000 yuan, an annual operating fee of 20,000 yuan, and a design fee of 1,800 yuan,\" and \"a deposit of 30,000 yuan will be directly reduced or waived if you pay it before January 31st.\"If we simply calculate based on the current 10,000 yuan deposit for franchisees, 3,000 franchisees have allowed Lu Zhengyao to accumulate more than 30 million yuan in a short period of time. Compared to the pressure of tight cash flow under the previous direct-operation model, the franchise model makes money much faster, and the more stores you sign, the bigger the wealth snowball becomes.In addition to single-store franchising, regional franchising is a new way for China Bite Workshop to expand its market share.The so-called regional franchise is when both parties agree on how many stores to open in a region within a year, which is equivalent to franchising a region as a package. \"We have already leased 80 stores in Chaoyang District,\" the person in charge revealed. There are no restrictions on the types of stores in the leased area, and the 80 stores can also be stalls.According to the investment promotion materials of China Bite Workshop, the project's gross profit margin is 50%. To ensure franchisees' gross profit margins, the brand's supply price is 50% of the product's list price, and franchisees can ultimately set the price according to their own needs.However, this approach can easily lead franchisees into price wars. Although there are minimum price settings, price adjustments become a sensitive competition among franchisees, and franchisees with a large number of stores in the package area have an advantage. China Bite Workshop's investment promotion staff promised that to prevent malicious competition, a 500-meter radius of the store would be set as a protective distance.China Bite Workshop, which pioneered the franchise model, has also replicated to some extent the high subsidy strategy that Lu Zhengyao was good at before, not charging franchisees a profit share, but instead rewarding franchisees for recruiting people. On the one hand, they are trying to stimulate store expansion. For example, if a franchisee in a super first-tier city introduces a new partner or opens a store themselves, they can receive a bonus of 25,000 yuan per store. On the other hand, rewards ranging from 7 to 15 yuan will be given for attracting new qualified consumers in the early stages.It sounds like the franchise threshold is not high, and the subsidies are generous. Behind this is a continuation of Lu Zhengyao's past approach: rapid scaling up and then finding a profit point. However, for price-sensitive consumers, low prices are the key to success, and retaining users has always been a challenge after subsidies subsided.Of course, based on past experience, Lu Zhengyao could also choose to go public after growing in scale, buying time and space in the capital market.In recent years, franchising has been widely used in projects such as catering, milk tea, and education, which has been accompanied by doubts about \"harvesting retail investors,\" and even the emergence of fraudulent franchising schemes and contract fraud. Many brands rapidly expanded their influence through franchise models in the early stages, but subsequently failed to keep up in supply chain control, quality assurance, price competition, and personnel management, causing operational difficulties for franchisees and intensifying conflicts between franchisees and brands amid the wave of store closures.For Lu Zhengyao, who has no franchise management experience, the real test has not yet begun.Is ready-made food a good track?With the development of the \"lazy stay-at-home economy,\" ready-made food is gradually moving from B-end to C-end, becoming a hot trend. Celebrating the Lunar New Year locally has spurred a surge in the ready-made food market.Why did Lu Zhengyao's team also take a liking to ready-made food?In a media interview, Li Yingbo stated that cooking has a wider audience and more rigid demand than coffee. The normalization of the pandemic is changing people's dining habits, and the advancement of cold chain preservation technology has brought ready-made food into a more mature stage.The opening of several directly operated stores of China Bite Workshop before the Spring Festival was a test of the product and model.China Bite Workshop relies on offline stores for sales, and users can also choose to pick up their orders online or have them delivered to their homes. In mid-January, \"Leopard Change\" observed at the offline directly operated store of Beijing ChingBite Workshop (Jinyu Lijingyuan Store) that five freezers were set up on site. Staff said that the current delivery distance of ChingBite Workshop is three kilometers, and other orders can be picked up offline by consumers.As a long-time user of Luckin Coffee, I am no stranger to the China Bite Workshop model. By selecting products and placing orders on the APP and having them delivered through takeout, Luckin Coffee broke Starbucks' dominance over consumers with its low prices and delivery. Despite the fraud scandal and team reshuffle, Luckin Coffee has been able to maintain its foothold in the coffee chain industry. This is related to its product strength, with its new product \"Coconut Latte\" becoming popular in 2021 and even triggering another consumer boom for Luckin Coffee.For China Bite Workshop, in addition to low prices, the emergence of a blockbuster product is key to building brand influence. China Bite Workshop currently has 100 SKUs, and store staff say that Kung Pao Chicken is selling well.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1e9f8592191954b25180cd8883d5fd2\" tg-width=\"550\" tg-height=\"412\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/>ready-made food/Leopard Transformation inside China Bite WorkshopCultivating highly recognized blockbuster products among consumers is crucial for how China Bite Workshop can break through among a host of ready-made food players.Even before the establishment of China Bite Workshop, competition in the ready-made food market was already fierce. Upstream meat and aquatic product companies, midstream frozen food and instant food companies, and downstream fresh food e-commerce platforms and branded catering companies all began to make arrangements, and many players were also targeting C-end users. In April 2021, Weizhixiang, the first stock in ready-made food, was listed, which boosted optimism in the secondary market and further stimulated enthusiasm for ready-made food in the primary market.Compared to other brands, China Bite Workshop was established relatively late. These competitors already have strong consumer awareness and a fixed consumer base. Zhenwei Xiaomeiyuan and Maizima, which focus on ready-made food, have average order values between 20 and 40 yuan, and have received capital support. Ruxi Bei, a catering player, has launched the \"Jia Guolong Kung Fu Cuisine\" ready-made food brand. Hema, Dingdong Maicai, Missfresh, Yonghui, and others have all extended the possibilities of ready-made food consumption in their respective fields.These fresh food retail e-commerce players, in particular, have strong supply chain systems, abundant SKUs, and well-established delivery capabilities, which will directly compete with China Bite Workshop. In 2021, Missfresh had more than 800 ready-made food SKUs on its platform; Dingdong Maicai also stated that in 2021, sales of all ready-made food products on the platform increased by 300% compared to 2020.It is currently unclear what China Bite Workshop's competitive advantages are and how much market share it can carve out among so many players.Behind the rapid gathering of franchisees, China Bite Workshop is also trying to break this deadlock. Only when the franchise store is large enough can it negotiate with suppliers, enrich its SKUs, gain more bargaining power, profit from the price difference in the supply chain, and reduce costs in various aspects such as delivery.In addition to using subsidies and support to attract franchisees, China Bite Workshop is trying to capture the vision of its target customer group through younger channels. Li Yingbo once said that it will do a lot of campaigning on Douyin, Xiaohongshu and Bilibili to direct public domain traffic to the China Bite Workshop App and then distribute it to offline franchise stores.The aggressive marketing strategy is the same as Luckin Coffee's back then, but the direct operation and franchise models are different. The final effect of spending money on marketing may not be the same. After all, it is easier for brands to control and manage directly operated stores to ensure subsequent consumption and repeat purchases, while there is more uncertainty in the management of franchise stores. Once service flaws or quality problems occur, it will lead to a backlash for the brand.Twists and turns, new stories are hard to tell.Lu Zhengyao's return to the business world has been fraught with twists and turns, with his entrepreneurial project changing direction twice in four months. The shift from the asset-heavy approach that teams were good at in the past to the asset-light model of franchising is both a proactive and a passive and helpless move.In early August 2021, \"Qu Xiaomian\" officially opened as Lu Zhengyao's last battle before retirement. From the outside perspective, this project carries the \"Luckin Coffee gene\". According to the plan at the time, the second batch of Qu Xiaomian stores was to reach 500.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0599d3d0eeb00e674090d985206cf263\" tg-width=\"550\" tg-height=\"331\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/>However, a month after opening, Tech Planet quoted an employee of ChingBite Technology as saying that the company was basically operating at a loss. In early September, the expansion plan for the second batch of cities was suspended.As can be seen from previous comments from Qu Xiaomian stores, many consumers felt that the price of a serving of noodles was 20-30 yuan, and a set meal cost 40-50 yuan, which was not cost-effective. If it weren't for the promotion and discount, Qu Xiaomian would not be very attractive in the competition among a number of noodle brands.At the end of October, Qu Xiaomian began adding a new dish, Bayu Hot Pot Burger, hinting at a route adjustment. In November, the store's name was changed to Qubayu, and the menu expanded from its previous main focus on noodles. According to Dianping, there are currently three Qubayu stores operating in Beijing, all with ratings below 4. The first Qu Xiaomian store in Beijing, located in Phoenix Plaza Shopping Center, was also reported to have closed in early January 2022.The recruitment situation reflects that Lu Zhengyao's team has been recruiting relevant personnel from ready-made food since November 2021. At that time, the plan to enter the ready-made food market should have already been implemented, and the Spring Festival was a crucial time to experience the pre-cooked food market through directly operated stores.In Lu Zhengyao's business expansion, burning money to gain scale has always been key. From CAR Inc. and UCAR Inc. to Luckin Coffee, companies initially invested heavily in assets, burning money to subsidize users, and then aimed to profit through scaling up.When CAR Inc. was aggressively expanding its marketing efforts by attracting new users with \"zero rental on the first day,\" Lu Zhengyao once said that there is usually a critical point for economies of scale, and once this point is reached, it will definitely be profitable. For the Quxiaomian project, Lu Zhengyao's strategy is to \"open 500 stores nationwide\" and \"build it into a food court, and eventually form an online App\".But as soon as the story began, the pause button was quickly pressed. This is due to the impact of the pandemic on offline businesses, as well as difficulties in resolving financing issues.Heavy asset investment and cash-burning subsidies meant that a lot of capital support was needed in the early stages. After experiencing the fraud scandal, Lu Zhengyao's reputation in the capital market was not as good as before. In April 2020, Luckin Coffee was exposed for financial fraud amounting to 2.2 billion yuan, triggering a crisis of trust in Chinese concept stocks and extending the crisis of trust in Lu Zhengyao to the domestic investment circle.Public information disclosed that ChingeBite Technology completed a RMB 550 million Series A financing round in August 2021, led by PCCW Capital. A month after the Quxiaomian project was launched, news of financing was revealed. In the first half of 2021, the noodle business was highly favored by capital, with major noodle shops raising funds, from new ramen brands Ma Jiyong, Zhang Lala, and Chen Xianggui to Yujian Xiaomian, Zuimian, and Hefu Laomian. However, Qu Xiaomian, valued at 1 billion yuan, sought 100 million yuan in financing, but ultimately nothing came of it.By jumping into the ready-made food boom and choosing to build the China Bite Workshop brand through franchising, the initial capital threshold is not high. As long as you can gather a group of franchisees, it is equivalent to gathering a group of \"investors\" for the brand.However, these \"investors\" are also the operators of various franchise stores. At present, it seems that China Bite Workshop can get off to a quick start through the franchisee model, but the difficulty of further cultivation is increasing exponentially. For Lu Zhengyao, the real test is yet to come.</body></html>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_bxVfSDoSQY7wc7bGVv3-Q\">豹变</a>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/a74a875047b4cb443b66b1d62bccb46f","relate_stocks":{"BK0244":"餐饮"},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_bxVfSDoSQY7wc7bGVv3-Q","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1127592873","content_text":"一改此前擅长的重资产投入、烧钱换规模的打法，陆正耀的舌尖工坊走起了加盟模式，以预制菜为矛，让加盟商成为“投资人”，能再造个瑞幸吗，陆正耀这次想割哪一波韭菜？作者 |潘捷如果按照陆正耀的规划，虎年春节过后不久，北京、上海等城市的街道里，将会密集出现一个全新的品牌面孔——舌尖工坊，主打预制菜，开店的速度和营销冲击力，就像当年瑞幸咖啡崛起时一般。2017年10月，在国内开出第一家店铺的瑞幸咖啡，到2018年12月25日，门店数量就达到了2000家。瑞幸速度让陆正耀和神州系迎来高光时刻，但快速上市的瑞幸很快又爆出22亿财务造假，之前有多光鲜，在此之后就有狼狈。如今陆正耀等相关方被彻底清理出瑞幸，不甘寂寞的商界老炮又重出江湖折腾新创业。2021年8月，陆正耀的趣小面开张，计划在全国开500家门店，在外界看来这个自带瑞幸基因的项目，并没有激起多大水花。三个月后经历改名风波，融资难解，拓店进度大大滞后。此后，把目光又投向另一个风口预制菜的陆正耀，一改擅长的重资产投入、烧钱换规模的打法，走起了加盟模式。舌尖工坊能承载起陆正耀的新野心吗？陆正耀也看中了加盟商？陆正耀擅长在风口上寻找财富命脉。2021年上半年资本热衷“吃面”，陆正耀的舌尖科技推出趣小面，无奈战绩不佳，迅速调整方向后，确定了新风口——预制菜。预制菜是预先制作完成的半成品，厂商把菜提前加工好通过冷冻或者真空包装来售卖。过去预制菜更多是针对餐饮行业B端的生意，如今随着年轻人“下厨房”热度攀升，预制菜看中了C端普通消费者，食材都已处理好，只需要简单翻炒便可以出锅，迎合了年轻消费者的需求。C端市场潜力巨大，陆正耀的舌尖工坊将目标放在了C端赛道。1月21日，舌尖科技轮值CEO李颖波在接受财新等媒体采访时表示，近期，舌尖科技已经开设了10家线下直营店，已签约3000多家加盟商，计划从2月底起以加盟的模式开始扩张。北京一家舌尖工坊直营店/豹变加盟的拓店速度比起直营自然快了许多，这大概也是吸取了此前瑞幸、趣小面等项目的经验和教训。瑞幸前期直营门店的拓展速度已让业内惊叹，发展到3000家店，耗时21个月。但直营门店背后意味着租金、装修成本、设备、人工、营销等诸多成本，需要品牌商承担巨大的资金压力。瑞幸上市时披露的招股书显示，2018年营业成本中，销售和市场营销费用、门店租金及人工是开支中最大的两项，分别达到人民币7.5亿元和5.8亿元，这两项叠加占总成本的比重为53.6%，而当年的总收入也仅为8.4亿元人民币。高昂的成本导致现金流紧张，瑞幸只能不停融资找钱。而加盟这种模式，将各类风险、成本更多分散给了加盟商，降低了舌尖工坊自身的风险，对于品牌来说属于轻资产模式。过去从神州系到瑞幸咖啡，甚至是趣小面，陆正耀都侧重重资产推进的路径，如今也不得不搞起了加盟店。一位北京舌尖工坊加盟招商的负责人告诉《豹变》，目前北京有3家直营店，北京各区已经签约了360-370家加盟店，只有东城、西城、顺义、房山等地是可以签加盟合约，其他地区都已经被加盟商拿下了。舌尖工坊提供的加盟店型有5种，最小的面积为8平方米，投资金额为3万元起。加盟一家舌尖工坊，需要“3万品牌使用费，3万保证金，每年2万运营费用，1800设计费用”，“1.31前交完意向金，3万的品牌使用费直接减免”。如果按照目前加盟缴纳1万元意向金来简单计算，3000家加盟商已让陆正耀在短短时间内沉淀了3000多万元资金。比起之前直营打法下现金流捉襟见肘的压力，加盟模式来钱快多了，签约的门店越多财富雪球越大。除了单店加盟，包区域加盟更是舌尖工坊跑马圈地的新方式。所谓区域加盟，就是双方谈妥规定在这个区域一年内开多少家门店，相当于打包出去一个区域的加盟。“朝阳区加盟已经包出了80家门店”，上述负责人透露，包区域的门店店型没有限制，80家门店也可以是档口店。舌尖工坊的招商材料上称，项目毛利率50%。为了保证加盟商的毛利率，品牌方的供货价格是按照商品标价的50%来提供，最终加盟商可以根据自己的需要定价。不过，这种做法很容易让加盟商家陷入价格战，虽然有最低价格的设置，但是调价成为加盟商之间敏感的竞争，占有大量门店的包区域加盟商更有优势。而舌尖工坊的招商人员承诺为防止恶意竞争，门店半径500米将会设置为保护距离。以加盟模式开路的舌尖工坊也一定程度上复制了此前陆正耀擅长的高补贴打法，不收加盟商利润分成，还给加盟商拉人头奖励。一方面试图刺激门店裂变，比如一个超一线城市加盟商如果介绍新的合伙作伴，或者自己再开店，可以获得2.5万元/店的奖金。另一方面，前期拉到新的合格消费者，也会给予7到15元不等的奖励。听起来加盟门槛不高，补贴多多，背后也是延续陆正耀过去的思路，迅速规模化，然后找到盈利点。但对于价格敏感的消费者群体来说，低价才是永远的奶酪，补贴退潮后如何留住用户一直是个难题。当然按照过往的经验，陆正耀也可以在规模做大后，选择上市，去资本市场上拿时间换空间。这几年餐饮、奶茶、教育等项目上加盟疯狂应用，与之相伴随的是“割韭菜”的质疑，甚至出现套路加盟、合同诈骗。大量品牌前期借助加盟模式迅速扩大影响力，但是后续在供应链管控、品质保证、价格竞争、人员管理上无法跟进，造成加盟商经营困境，闭店潮下加盟商与品牌之间的矛盾激化。对于没有加盟管理经验的陆正耀来说，真正的考验还没开始。预制菜是一条好赛道吗？伴随“懒宅经济”的发展，预制菜逐渐从B端走向C端，成为风口。就地过年更是催生了一波预制菜行情。陆正耀团队为什么也看中了预制菜？李颖波接受媒体采访时曾表示，烹饪相比咖啡的受众圈层更广泛，需求更刚性，疫情常态化正在改变大众用餐习惯，加上冷链保鲜技术的进步，使得预制菜进入更成熟的阶段。而春节前期舌尖工坊几家直营店的开业，正是对产品和模式的测试。舌尖工坊的依托线下门店销售，用户也可以在线上下单后选择门店自提或配送到家。《豹变》1月中旬在北京舌尖工坊（金隅丽景园店）线下直营店观察到，现场布置了5个冷柜，工作人员称，目前舌尖工坊的配送距离为三公里，其他的订单支持消费者线下自提。作为瑞幸的老用户，对舌尖工坊这个模式也不陌生，在APP上选品下单，以外卖的形式配送，瑞幸靠着低价、配送打破了星巴克对消费者的心智占领。瑞幸咖啡在经历造假风波、团队洗牌后，依然能在咖啡连锁领域站住脚，与其产品力相关，2021年的新品“生椰拿铁”走红甚至再度引发瑞幸的消费热潮。对于舌尖工坊来说，除了低价，一款爆品的出现是打出品牌影响力的关键。舌尖工坊SKU目前有100个，门店的工作人员称目前宫爆鸡丁的销售情况较好。舌尖工坊内部的预制菜/豹变而培育出在消费者群体中认知度较高的爆品，关系到后续舌尖工坊如何在一众预制菜玩家中突围。早在舌尖工坊创立前，预制菜赛道的竞争已经非常激烈，上游肉类、水产品公司，中游速冻食品、速食品，下游生鲜电商平台、品牌餐饮等公司都开始有所布局，不少玩家也是瞄准了C端用户。2021年4月，预制菜第一股“味知香”上市，推动了二级市场的乐观情绪，更加激发了一级市场对预制菜的热情。相比于其他品牌，舌尖工坊设立较晚，这些对手已有较强的消费者认知和固定的消费群体，主打预制菜的珍味小梅园、麦子妈等客单价在20元-40元之间，获得了资本加持。餐饮玩家如西贝开设了“贾国龙功夫菜”预制菜品牌。盒马、叮咚买菜、每日优鲜、永辉等纷纷在自己的领域延伸预制菜消费可能性。尤其是这些生鲜零售电商玩家，本身有强大的供应链体系，SKU丰富，也有完善的配送能力，会与舌尖工坊形成直接竞争。2021年，每日优鲜平台预制菜SKU超过800多个；叮咚买菜也表示，2021年平台上预制菜全线产品销量同比2020年增长300%。舌尖工坊的竞争优势在哪，能在诸多玩家的格局中撕开多大市场，目前并不清晰。急速聚拢加盟商的背后，舌尖工坊也是试图破这个局，只有加盟店规模足够大，才能和供应商进行谈判，丰富SKU，获得更多议价权，赚取供应链差价，同时降低配送等各方面成本。除了用补贴和扶持争取加盟商，舌尖工坊在用户端试图通过更年轻的渠道占领目标客群的视野，李颖波曾称，将在抖音、小红书、B站做大量投放，把公域流量导到舌尖工坊的App，再分发给线下加盟店。强营销的打法跟瑞幸咖啡当年一致，但是直营和加盟的模式有差别，撒钱营销最后的效果可能并不一致，毕竟直营店品牌方更容易做品控和管理，保证后续的消费和复购，加盟店的管理不确定性更多，一旦出现服务瑕疵、品质问题，就会导致品牌受到反噬。一波三折，新故事不好讲陆正耀此番重出江湖，创业项目一波三折，四个月中两次换方向。从过去团队擅长的重资产打法走向加盟这种轻资产模式，既有主动为之，也是被动和无奈之举。2021年8月初，作为陆正耀退休前最后一战——“趣小面”正式开业，外界看来这个项目带着“瑞幸基因”。按照当时的规划，趣小面第二批店面要达到500家。然而，开业一个月后，Tech星球援引一位舌尖科技公司员工的采访称，当时基本处于全线亏损的状态。9月初，第二批城市的拓展计划已经暂停。在趣小面此前的店铺留言中可以看出，不少消费者觉得一份面价位在20-30元，套餐需要四五十，价格上并不划算，如果不是做活动打折扣，趣小面在一众粉面品牌的竞争中吸引力并不强。10月末，趣小面开始新增了菜品巴渝火锅堡，暗示了路线调整。11月店铺名称也改为趣巴渝，菜品对之前主打的面食进行了扩充。大众点评显示，目前北京地区有3家趣巴渝店营业，评分均在4分以下。位于凤凰汇购物中心的趣小面北京首店，也在2022年1月初被爆关店。招聘情况反映，从2021年11月，陆正耀团队已经开始招聘预制菜相关人员。彼时切入预制菜赛道的规划应该已经实施，通过直营店感受预制菜市场，春节是个关键时点。在陆正耀的商业拓展中，烧钱换规模一直是关键。从神州租车、神州优车到瑞幸咖啡，前期重资产投入，烧钱补贴获取用户，然后以期通过规模化获益。神州租车在疯狂营销，通过“首日0租金”吸引新用户激进扩张时，陆正耀曾表示，规模效应通常会有一个临界点，只要达到这个点，就一定会盈利。在趣小面项目上，陆正耀计划的策略是“在全国开500家门店”，“做成一个美食城，最终形成一个线上化的App”。但这次故事刚刚开始，就迅速按下了暂停键。背后有疫情影响线下生意，也有融资问题难解等困境。重资产投入、烧钱补贴意味着前期需要大量资本支援，经历过造假风波后，陆正耀在资本市场的声誉大不如前。2020年4月，瑞幸被爆出财务造假高达22亿元，引发中概股信任危机，国内投资圈也延伸出陆正耀信任危机。公开信息披露，舌尖科技于2021年8月完成5.5亿元人民币A轮融资，由盈科资本领投。趣小面项目推出后一个月，被爆出融资消息。2021年上半年粉面生意备受资本青睐，从拉面新品牌马记永、张拉拉、陈香贵，到遇见小面、醉面、和府捞面，各大面馆纷纷融资。然而趣小面以10亿元估值，寻求1亿元融资，最终没有了下文。投身到预制菜风口，选择以加盟的形式打造舌尖工坊品牌，前期资金量门槛并不高，只要能聚拢一波加盟商，就相当于为品牌方召集了一波“投资人”。只是这些“投资人”也是各个加盟店的运营人，目前看起来舌尖工坊通过加盟商模式能迅速开局，但后续深耕的难度呈指数升级。对于陆正耀来说，真正的考验还在后面。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":4087,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":3,"subscribersOnly":false,"subscribersOnlyAccessible":false,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"hasMoreComment":false,"orderType":2}